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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows: 
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to award 
Petitioner her presumed fifty percent (50%) of the value of the parties' marital property. 
a. Standard of Review: The standards of review as to this issue are correctness 
in that the district court misunderstood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, and the court's clear abuse of discretion. See Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 
180 (Utah App. 2002). 
b. Citation to record where issue preserved in trial court: Record on appeal, pages 
793-809. 
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to award 
Petitioner fifty percent (50%) of the appreciated value of Dune Road and fifty percent (50%) 
of the value of the Dune Road rental account. 
a. Standard of Review: The standard of review as to this issue is clear abuse of 
discretion. See Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 180 (Utah App. 2002). 
b. Citation to record where issue preserved in trial court: Record on appeal, pages 
793-809. 
Issue No. 3: Whether in using the "back out" method of awarding the parties' assets, 
the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give Petitioner credit for the equity in the 
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Park City Condo, as well as charging Petitioner with her disproportionate share of any deficit 
in the marital equity of the parties. 
a. Standard of Review: The standard of review as to this issue is clear abuse of 
discretion. See Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176,180 (Utah App. 2002). 
b. Citation to record where issue preserved in trial court: Record on appeal, pages 
793-809. 
Issue No. 4: Whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that Petitioner 
is not the reason that Respondent did not sell all of Dune Road. 
a. Standard of Review: The standard of review as to this issue is whether the 
evidence clearly preponderates against such finding. See Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176,180 
(Utah App. 2002). 
b. Citation to record where issue preserved in trial court: Record on appeal, pages 
793-809. 
Issue No. 5: Whether the district court abused its discreti on in finding that in the future 
Petitioner will benefit greatly from Dune Road. 
a. Standard of Review: The standard of review as to this issue is whether the 
evidence clearly preponderates against such finding. See Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176,180 
(Utah App. 2002). 
b. Citation to record where issue preserved in trial court: Record on appeal, pages 
793-809. 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action. Following a trial in February, 2005, on April 29,2005 the 
district court signed and caused to be entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and Decree of Divorce. The findings, conclusions and decree dealt with the custody of the 
parties' sole minor child, approved a parenting plan, specified parent-time rights, and 
determined and allocated interests in the marital and separate properties owned by the parties. 
The district court's failure to award portions of certain of such properties to petitioner are the 
sole issues on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. Petitioner Marjorie M. Hayes ("Margee") and Respondent Arthur C. Hayes 
("Chuck") were husband and wife having been married on December 20, 1998, in Valley 
Forge, State of Pennsylvania. Their marriage was the first marriage for each them. (Add. A, 
12). 
1
 All references to the Addenda included in this brief shall be cited as "Add." followed 
by a letter designation as to that division of the Addendum cited. All references to Add. A, 
containing the Findings of Facts shall be cited by paragraph numbers. All references to Add. 
B, containing the Conclusions of Law shall be cited by paragraph numbers. All references 
to Add. C, the Memorandum Decision of February 18,2005, shall be cited by page numbers. 
All references to Add. D, the transcript of the trial proceedings, shall be cited by page 
numbers. All references to Add. E, the record on appeal, shall be cited by page numbers. 
All references to Add. F, the transcript of the June 6, 2005 hearing, shall be cited by page 
numbers. 
No copies of any of the exhibits admitted at trial have been included in the 
Addendum, but all references to such exhibits shall be cited as "Ex." followed by their 
numbers. 
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2. Margee and Chuck separated and this action was commenced on or about 
November 3,2003. The parties were married for approximately five years as of the date of 
separation and six years as of the date of trial. (Add. A, f 3). 
3. Margee's date of birth is May 28,1957, making her 47 years of age at the time 
of trial. (Add. A, f 5). 
4. Chuck's date of birth is December 14,1944, making him 60 years of age at the 
time of trial. (Add. A, f 6). 
5. Margee holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from Southern 
Methodist University. (Add. A, f 7). 
6. In 1968 Chuck received a BS degree from Michigan State University in liberal 
arts, with economics as a minor. (Add. A, f 8). 
7. On or about 1969, Chuck accepted employment with Chemical Bank in 
Manhattan, New York, which employment continued for approximately 10 years. (Add. A, 
19). 
8. During his employment by Chemical Bank, Chuck held several different 
positions ending up as a Vice President in charge of the bank's agribusiness group, the 
objective of which was to lend money and provide financial services to large corporate 500 
companies in the agriculture industry. (Add. A, f 11). 
9. During the course of performing his duties as Vice President of the bank's 
agribusiness group, Chuck was involved in real estate transactions involving mortgages and 
other types of loans. (Add. A, f 12). 
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10. The parties first met in the State of New York in the early summer of 1998 and 
Chuck moved to Park City, Utah to live with Margee in about July 1998. (Add. A, f 13). 
11. Prior to the parties' marriage, Margee was pregnant with the parties' child, 
Cheyanna Hayes ("Cheyanna") which child was born July 19,1999, making Cheyanna five 
years of age at the time of trial. (Add. A, f 14). 
12. There are no other children bom as issue of the parties' marriage. (Add. A, [^ 
15). 
13. As of the time of trial, Margee had been employed as a flight attend by Delta 
Airlines ("Delta") for over twenty-five (25) years. (Add. A, f 22). 
14. Just prior to their marriage, the parties agreed that after their marriage Chuck 
would continue with his real estate development business and provide a home for the family, 
and that Margee would continue to work as a flight attendant and provide steady income and 
valuable employment benefits for their family. (Add. A, % 36). 
15. Either on the date of their marriage or during their marriage, the parties owned 
or acquired the separate and marital properties described in the Schedule of Properties found 
in Add. E, pp. 807, 808 , which properties had the values at the time of the marriage and at 
the time of trial as indicated in the such schedule. (Add. A, fl 37, 39-41,44-52, 94, 103, 
106-114; Add. E. pp. 807-809). 
16. As of the time of the parties' marriage, Chuck owned separate pre-marital 
property having a total value of $ 1,115,000. (ibid). 
17. As of the time of the parties' marriage, Margee owned separate pre-marital 
property having a total value of $466,350. (ibid). 
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18. Chuck owned a residence in Quogue, New York, which was sold just prior to 
the marriage. The proceeds were deposited in his individual account at Suffock County 
National Bank, and then transferred by CD to his individual First Security Bank, Utah 
account, in the amount of $349,000. A substantial portion of the proceeds from the sale of 
this residence were used towards the purchase of the lot and construction of the parties' 
marital home located at 938 Aerie Drive, Park City, Utah (the "Marital Home"). (Add. A, 
137). 
19. In 1975, Chuck purchased that certain residential property located at 917 Dune 
Road, West Hampton Beach, New York 11978 ("Dune Road"), which property Chuck kept 
for 23 years, paid taxes on, maintained, participated in litigation against the U.S. government 
compelling the government to protect the beach front area, and remodeled and rebuilt three 
times between 1980 and the time of the parties' marriage. (Add. A, ffl[ 38, 56, 59). 
20. At the time of the parties' marriage, Chuck was still the owner of Dune Road 
which had a then current value of $600,000. (Add. A, K 38). 
21. At the time of the parties' marriage, Chuck owned a lot in Florida which he 
sold on February 5,1999, for the sum of $117,000. The net proceeds of $106,632.77 were 
deposited into his individual bank account, and a substantial portion of that money was 
subsequently used for the purchase of the necessary building lot and the construction of the 
Marital Home. (Add. A, J 39). 
22. At the time of the parties' marriage, Chuck had an additional $60,000 in New 
York banks which he transferred to First Security Bank of Utah. (App. A, f 40). 
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23. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a condominium 
located in Chicago, Illinois (the "Chicago Condo"), which property had a then current value 
of approximately $88,5000, less an indebtedness against the property in the amount of 
approximately $28,500, or a then current net value of $60,000. (App. A, | 41). 
24. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a condominium 
located at 1525 Park Avenue, Park City, Utah, (the "Park City Condo"), which property had 
a then current value of $190,000, less an indebtedness against the property in the amount of 
approximately $55,000, or a then current net value of $135,000. (App. A, | 42). 
25. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a Delta Credit 
Union Employee 401(k) Account (the "401(k) Account") which had a then current value of 
$126,150. On or about December 26, 1998, Margee designated Chuck as a primary 
beneficiary of the 401(k) Account, and he was still the primary beneficiary on the 401(k) 
Account as of the date of trial, which designation changed upon dissolution of the marriage. 
(App. A, | 47). 
26. Beginning in July of 1998 and through January of 2000, the parties lived in the 
Park City Condo as their marital residence. (App. A, | 95). 
27. Within one month after the parties' marriage, that is in January 1999, Chuck 
paid off the indebtedness against the Park City Condo in the amount of $55,000, which 
payment was not a "gift" but was done as part of the marriage and because it made economic 
sense as the interest rate was 9%, and allowed the Park City Condo to be rented at a profit. 
(Add. A, | | 37,43, 94). 
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28. On or about February 1,1999, the parties jointly decided to purchase the lot on 
which to build the Marital Home. (Add. A, f 61). 
29. Feeling that he could not build the Marital Home as promised without 
additional cash, for a period of at least six (6) months during 1999, Chuck tried 
unsuccessfully to sell Dune Road for $650,000. (Add. D, pp. 231-234). 
30. Knowing of Chuck's desire to raise money to build the Marital Home as 
promised, and based upon her strong desire to keep Dune Road in the family as a rental 
property, investment and vacation home, in October 1999, Margee approached her mother 
Dorothy Hinkley and encouraged and begged Mrs. Hinkley to purchase a one-half interest 
in Dune Road. (App. A, ^ 54; App. D, p. 155). 
31. Effective as of November, 1999, Chuck and Mrs. Hinkley entered into a written 
agreement pursuant to which Chuck sold a fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune Road to Mrs. 
Hinkley for $325,000, which was paid in full by February of 2000, which fifty percent (50%) 
interest had increased in value as of the time of trial to more than $1 Million. (Add. A, ^ f 55, 
58). 
32. By his own admission, without selling a fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune 
Road, Chuck could not have built the Marital Home. (App. D, pp. 235-238). 
33. As a result of Margee's facilitating the sale of the fifty percent (50%) in Dune 
Road to her mother, Chuck was able to retain a fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune Road for 
over five (5) additional years up to the time of trial. (App. A, f 54). 
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34. Chuck's interest in Dune Road escalated in value tremendously by $450,000, 
from $600,000 as of the time of the marriage to $ 1,050,000 at the time of trial (App. C, p. 8; 
App. E, pp. 807, 808). 
35. The fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune Road retained by Chuck is Chuck's 
separate pre-marital property. (Add. A, %% 44, 53). 
36. Margee helped with the construction of the Marital Home by participating in 
its design, cleaning, and selecting some of the materials and furnishings that went into the 
Marital Home, and Chuck acted as the general contractor with respect to the construction of 
the Marital Home. (App. A, fflf 61, 62) 
37. The acquisition of the lot for the Marital Home and the construction of the 
Marital Home on the lot cost the parties $700,000. (App. A, % 63). 
38. Chuck contributed non-marital property to the purchase of the lot for the 
Marital Home in the amount of $165,000 and for construction of the Marital Home in the 
amount of $454,000, which monies were derived directly from the sale of other properties 
which Chuck owned prior to the parties' marriage. (App. A, f 65). 
39. During the course of the parties' construction of the Marital Home, Margee 
contributed over $79,000 in cash and materials to accomplish such construction. (App. A, 
166). 
40. On or about February 1,2000, the parties and Cheyanna moved into the Marital 
Home. (App. A, f 69). 
41. The Martial Home was marital property. (App. A, | 6 7 ; App. B, % 17; App. C, 
p. 17; App. D, pp. 470,473,474). 
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42. From February 1, 2000 through November of 2001, and again from April 1, 
2002 through August 2003, the Park City Condo was rental property generating rental income 
for the parties. (App. A, f 96). 
43. From December 1,2001 and through March 2002, the parties lived in the Park 
City Condo as their marital residence, during which time the Marital Home was rented for 
the 2002 Winter Olympics, from which the parties received net rental income of 
approximately $40,000. (App. A, f 97). 
44. During the course of the parties' marriage, they lived in the Park City Condo 
as their marital residence a total of 22 months while the Marital Home was being constructed 
or when it was being rented out during the 2002 Winter Olympics. (App. A, f 98). 
45. Since on or about November 3,2003, the Park City has been the residence of 
Margee and Cheyanna. (App. A, f 100). 
46. The value of the Park City Condo at the time of trial was $ 150,000, or $40,000 
less than its value at the time of the parties' marriage, and the Park City Condo is marital 
property. (App. A, t l 94,101; App. D, p. 369; Ex. 118). 
47. At the time of trial, the Dune Road land by itself was worth at least $2 Million, 
and the key factors in increasing the value of Dune Road since the time of the parties' 
marriage have been market forces. (App. A, % 59). 
48. Any appreciation in the value of Chuck's undivided fifty percent (50%) interest 
in Dune Road or any income generated by Chuck's interest in Dune Road since the parties' 
marriage is Chuck's pre-marital separate property. (Add. A, f^t[ 44, 53). 
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49. On or about January 15, 2003, acting on behalf of himself and Margee, but 
without Margee's knowledge or consent, Chuck applied for a $300,000 line of credit with 
Washington Mutual Bank (the "Line of Credit5'), which Line of Credit was to be secured by 
the Marital Home. (App. A, ffif 70, 78). 
50. On or about February 4, 2003, the Line of Credit was approved by the bank. 
(App. A, 1f 76). 
51. To obtain the Line of Credit, but without any knowledge of, consent by or 
authorization from Margee, Chuck affixed Margee's signature or initials on the ten (10) 
documents required to obtain the Line of Credit, including a written promise on the part of 
Margee to pay up to the $300,000 limit of the Line of Credit. (App. A, Iff 77, 78). 
52. In anticipation of a sale of the Marital Home, on or about September 23,2003, 
Chuck signed an offer to purchase that certain residential building lot at 1211 Little Kate 
Road, Park City, Utah ("Kate Road") for a purchase price of $375,000, which offer was 
accepted as of that date. The purchase price consisted of a $100,000 down payment to be 
paid from the Line of Credit with the balance of the purchase price to be paid from the sale 
proceeds of the Marital Home. (App. A, ffi[ 82, 85,102). 
53. The Marital Home was sold on or about February 24,2004 for the reasonable 
net sum of $711,628 producing, after deduction for payment of liens, reimbursing some of 
Chucks expenses, and paying for some of Chuck's maintenance, cash deposited in an 
escrow account in the amount of $263,000 at the time of trial (the "$263,000 Account"), and 
ownership of Kate Road having a value of $381,000 at the time of trial. (App. A,ffi[ 64,91). 
723618vl 
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54. The Marital Home sold on February 24,2004, after the filing of this action, for 
a reasonable net sum of $711,628, and from the sale proceeds, the following amounts were 
deducted: 
a. $158,000 to pay off the Line of Credit; 
b $275,000 to pay off the balance owed on the note for Kate Road; and 
c. an amount to pay certain taxes and maintenance for Chuck. 
(App. A, 1f164, 91,104). 
55. The remaining proceeds from the sale of the Marital Home were as follows: 
a. the $263,000 Account, which is marital property; 
b. Kate Road valued at $381,000 as of the time of trial, which is marital 
property. 
(App. A, ffl[ 64, 78,91,105; App. D, pp. 369, 370,473,474). 
56. Any contributions made to Margee's retirement, pension or deferred 
compensation plan or plans during the marriage are marital property, subject to division 
between the parties pursuant to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders. 
57. During the parties' marriage, Margee, Chuck and Cheyanna benefitted greatly 
from the use of Dune Road. (App. A, % 57; Ex. 28,29). 
58. After the parties moved into the Marital Home, Chuck did not work and was 
not working at the time of trial. (Add. C, pp. 3, 4; Add. D, pp. 81, 120, 121, 251). 
59. Chuck misrepresented the fact that he could not work and there is no reason 
why Chuck could not have obtained employment to generate income other than what he 
produced from his real estate business. (Add. A, % 24; Add. C, pp 3,4). 
723618vl - 1 2 -
60- During Chuck's work-life history, he has never vested or invested in a 
retirement account, a 401(k) account, any deferred compensation or pension accounts. He 
has qualified for a nominal Social Security retirement at age 65. Chuck's sole source of 
revenue and virtually his only asset for retirement is the equity he had built from the 
purchase, renovation, sale and trade of residential real properties between 1974 and the time 
of trial. (App.A,f 93). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. By not awarding Petitioner her legally presumed 50% of the parties' 
marital property, together with 50% of the appreciated value of Dune Road and the Dune 
Road rental account, the district court abused its discretion in two ways: 
A. By misunderstanding or misapplying the law; and 
B. By achieving an unjust and inequitable overall result. 
As to misunderstanding or misapplying the law, the district court correctly determined 
that certain of the parties assets were marital property, but then adopted a "back out" scheme 
pursuant to which each of the parties was given back separate contributions to the marital 
property. However, such distribution was made without any determination on the part of the 
district court that there were any exceptional circumstances to justify such back out scheme. 
As to the overall unjust and inequitable result, not only did Petitioner continue her 
employment throughout the period of the marriage, and while Respondent did not work 
during most of the period of the marriage, the parties achieved an extraordinary financial 
return. However, virtually all of their increase was awarded by the district court to 
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Respondent. His estate increased in value by 58% during the marriage, while Petitioner's 
interest increased in value by only 16%. 
POINT II. Even if we assume for the sake of argument, that the district court's back 
out scheme was somehow legitimate, the district court abused its discretion again in two 
ways: 
A. By giving Petitioner credit for only $95,000 of her $135,000 in equity in the 
Park City Condo, which equity she brought to the marriage; and 
B. Even though Petitioner was awarded a vastly disproportionate share of the 
parties' marital property, by charging Petitioner with a full 50% share of the $18,900 deficit 
which occurred by the district court returning to the parties vastly disproportionate 
contributions to the marital property. 
As to refusing to give Petitioner $40,000 additional credit for her equity in the Park 
City Condo which she brought to the marriage, the district court charged Petitioner with the 
full $40,000 loss in value in the Park City Condo from the time of the marriage to the time 
of trial. This was done even though the district court gave Respondent full credit for his 
$55,000 contribution to the equity of the Park City Condo, which contribution was made only 
one month after the parties married. 
As to charging the Petitioner with 50% of the deficit, the disproportionate charge of 
$9,450 to Petitioner was done in the face of the district court's failure to award Petitioner 
50% of the marital property. 
POINT III. By finding that Petitioner is not the reason that Respondent did not sell 
all of Dune Road, and by finding that in the future Petitioner will benefit greatly from Dune 
723618vl - 1 4 -
Road, the district court abused its discretion because the evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary as to both findings. 
As to the finding that Petitioner is not the reason that Respondent did not sell all of 
Dune Road, the evidence is uncontraverted that after the parties married, Dune Road 
increased in value dramatically because of prevailing market forces rather than any financial 
contributions from the parties, and that but for Petitioner brokering the sale of one-half (1/2) 
of Dune Road from Respondent to Petitioner's mother, Respondent would not have owned 
any part of Dune Road as of the time of trial. However, because of Petitioner's efforts, 
Respondent's 50% interest in Dune Road increased in value from $325,000 in 1999 to 
$1,050,000 at the time of trial. 
As to the district court's finding that in the future Petitioner will benefit greatly from 
Dune Road, the evidence in the record makes it clear that such is not the case. Yet the district 
court relied on such erroneous fact in refusing to award Petitioner any portion of the 
appreciated value of Dune Road and the Dune Road rental account. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT. Based on the foregoing, there is no need 
to remand this matter to the district court, and Petitioner requests that the court issue its order 
awarding judgment in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent so as to equalize their 
entitlements to their marital property, the appreciated value of Dune Road, and the value of 
the Dune Road rental account. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINTI. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
AWARD MARGEE FIFTYPERCENT (50%) OFTHE VALUE OFTHE 
PARTIES' MARITAL PROPERTY AND THE APPRECIATED VALUE 
OF DUNE ROAD AND THE DUNE ROAD RENTAL ACCOUNT. 
The marital property at issue, having a total value of $794,000, consists of the 
$263,000 Account, Kate Road valued at $381,000 and the Park City Condo valued at 
$150,000. 
At trial, Chuck conceded that the Marital Home, which was sold prior to trial, and its 
residual byproducts, the $263,000 Account and Kate Road, were all marital property. The 
district court made the same findings and conclusions. See, Yk 41,55 of Statement of Facts. 
The district court also found and concluded that the Park City Condo was marital property, 
which determination Margee does not contest. 
Utah statutory law states that a district court is permitted to make ". . . equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations and parties." Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5(1). However, such an order as to an award of property ". . . must be based upon 
adequate factual findings that must be in accordance with the standards set by this state's 
appellate courts." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,1317 (Utah App. 1990). Further, findings 
" . . . should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps 
by which the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 131 
P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). 
Well settled Utah case law also states that a district court: 
. . . should first properly catagorize the parties' 
property as part of the martial estate or as a 
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separate property of one or the other. Each party 
is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and 50% of the martial property. 
But rather than simply enter such a decree, the 
court should then consider the existence of 
exceptional circumstances and, if any be shown, 
proceed to and effect an equitable distribution in 
light of those circumstances and in conformity 
with our decision. (Emphasis added.) 
Burtv. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1172 (UtahApp. 1990). Seealso, Waltersv. Walters, SUP 2d 
64, 68 (Utah App. 1991); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,1022 (Utah App. 1993). 
In spite of such legal requirements, no "exceptional circumstance" was described by 
the district court that would justify its failure to award Margee fifty percent (50%) of the 
value of the parties' marital property. Instead, the district court adopted a "back out" scheme 
of distribution that treated the marital property as separate property and awarded Margee her 
$79,000 contribution to the Marital Home and only $95,000 of her $135,000 contribution to 
the Park City Condo, plus fifty percent (50%) of the parties' other relatively insignificant 
items of marital property. Chuck was awarded all of the balance of the parties' marital 
property. In doing so, the district court misunderstood or misapplied the law, and clearly 
abused its discretion, as discussed below. 
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A. The district court misunderstood or misapplied the law by failing to 
award Margee her presumed fifty percent (50%) share of the value of the 
parties' marital property. 
As noted above, Margee is "presumed to be entitled to . . . 50% of the martial 
property." 
In spite of that presumption, and after finding and concluding that the Marital Home 
and its byproducts, the $263,000 Account and Kate Road, were all marital properties, the 
district court divided the parties' separate and marital properties as follows: 
Awarded to Chuck 
Properties 
Dune Road 
Florida Property 
1 *Kate Road 
Dune Road Rental Acct 
Cash accounts 
1 *$263,000 Account 
*93 Ford Taurus 
*98 Land Rover Discovery 
*02 Chevrolet Avalanche 
*Four Wheeler 
*401(k) Account 
TOTAL 
Values as of 
Date of Marriage 
| Dec. 20,1998 
$600,000 
106,000 
409,000 
$1,115,000 
Values as of 
Date of Trial 
Feb. 15,2005 
I $1,050,000 
381,000 
19,950 
248,450 
1,200 
9,900 
22,500 
2,000 
27,215 
$1,762,215 
Comments 
Quoque $349,000 
First Security $60,000 | 
*Marital Properties 
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Awarded to Margee 
Properties 
Chicago Condo (Net) 
•Park City Condo (Net) 
Sun Valley Condo (Net) 
Delta Credit Union 
(savings) 
Delta Credit Union 
(checking) 
|*Delta401(k) 
Delta Stock 
Sequoia Fund 
Sequoia IRA 
Vanguard Brokerage 
Service Acct 
Sun Valley Rental 
Account (Net) 
1994 Subaru Legacy 
1 *$263,000 Account 
TOTAL 
Value as of 
Date of Marriage 
Dec. 20,1998 
$ 60,000 
135,000(1) 
90,000 (2) 
! 14,300 
3,700 
126,150 
4,900 
3,500 
14,550 
2,250 
2,250 
$ 466,350 j 
Value as of 
Date of Trial 
Feb.15,2005 
| $ 150,000 
177,000(3) 
3,075 
725 
153,365 
3,575 
12,000 
19,200 
5,000 
975 
1,600 
14,550 
$541,065 
Notes 
1 (1) $190,000 less 
! 55,000 lien | 
i (2) $195,000 less 
$105,00 lien 
(3) $275,000 less 
; $98,000 lien | 
Gift from mother 
during marriage 
*Marital Property. 
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The district court arrived at such result without any rationale or explanation as to why 
Margee should fare worse financially than Chuck, regardless of their ages or how long they 
were married. Particularly given the fact that during the marriage Margee maintained her 
employment, while during most of the period of the marriage Chuck did not work. 
Furthermore, nowhere in its rulings has the district court provided us with language, 
as required by our case law, that is ". . . sufficiently detailed and including] enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue 
was reached/' The closest we come to any such language and disclosure is in paragraph 17 
of the conclusions, which reads as follows: 
The Court concludes that the most equitable way to deal with 
distribution of marital property (Aerie house2 and Park City 
Condo) is not to give Petitioner credit for simple appreciation of 
values, with respect to Dune Road, but to back out of the marital 
estate what was put in as each parties' separate property. 
This is the best we have in the entire record disclosing "the steps by which" the district court 
reached its ultimate decision. The record is void of any other step-by-step analysis. 
If we look at conclusion number 17 carefully, the only reason given for adopting the 
back out scheme is to " . . . not give Petitioner credit for simple appreciation of values, with 
respect to Dune Road, but to back out of the marital estate what was put in as each party's 
separate property." Thus, the district court mixes and ties its refusal to award 50% of the 
marital property to Margee, to its refusal to award any of the Dune Road appreciation to 
2
 The Aerie house is referred to throughout this brief as the Marital Home. 
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Margee. Margee is deemed to lose one award because she loses the other. It is one thing not 
to give Margee any credit for her protection and preservation of Dune Road,3 but it is quite 
another proposition to take away Margee's presumed 50% interest in the marital estate for 
no other reason than that she's not getting anything out of the appreciation of Dune Road 
either. In other words, the district court said 'Tin going to back out each party's 
contributions to the Marital Home and the Park City Condo, because I'm not awarding 
Margee any of the appreciated value of Dune Road." It is nonsensical and surely is not a 
sufficient reason to deny Margee her 50% share, once having decided that the property in 
question is marital and the legal presumption in favor of Margee is in effect. 
At most, what we are left with is that the district court used the back out scheme 
because the $263,000 Account and Kate Road, both marital properties, were the byproducts 
of the Marital Home, which was marital property, which in turn was partially the result of 
separate property contributions from each of the parties. In effect, the district court 
determined that those contributions were still separate properties, even though they had been 
melded into the marital property. In the case of such contributions to the $263,000 Account 
and Kate Road, the contributions had been made two steps earlier. Certainly, that is not a 
sufficient reason to divide the properties as was done here. If that were the case, then any 
time any marital property is a byproduct of separate property, the 50% presumption would 
never be observed. 
3
 See Point III below for further discussion of this issue. 
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In any event, what is crucial is that there is no nexus between the district court's 
categorization of the marital estate and any exceptional circumstance that justifies ignoring 
and not awarding Margee her 50% interest in the marital estate. 
In Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002) the Court reaffirmed the principle 
that: 
We disturb a trial court's property division and valuation "only 
when there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." (Citations 
omitted). 
By its failure to award Margee her mandated 50% presumptive share of the marital property, 
the district court misunderstood or misapplied the law, which failure has obviously resulted 
in substantial and prejudicial damage to Margee. 
It is also helpful to note that when confronted with this argument at the hearing on 
Margee's Rule 52(b) motion to amend and make additional findings and amend the judgment, 
the district court still failed to make any findings or conclusions as to any exceptional 
circumstance to defeat the 50% presumption in favor of Margee. Instead, the district court 
stated " . . . I did the best I could with it, and I think I'm right." and "I think that what I did 
was correct under the law; and I think what I did was equitable. That's why I did it." See 
Add. F, pp. 25,26. Good intentions aside, the improper result remains because the district 
court either misunderstood or did not follow the law and award Margee her 50% presumptive 
share of the parties' marital property. 
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B. The district court abused its discretion by failing to award Margee a just 
and equitable share of the marital property. 
It is well understood that an appellate court will not overturn a trial court's order 
relating to the property of divorcing parties absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. 
A clear abuse of discretion includes the situation when a trial court's distribution of property 
in a divorce action works a manifest injustice or inequity. See Burge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350 
(Utah App. 2004). 
As argued in Point LA. above, the failure of the district court to award Margee her 
presumed 50% share of the marital property, was a reversible abuse of discretion because of 
its misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. However, as was said in Dunn v. Dunn, 
supra, at page 1323,"... the trial court abused its discretion when it justified an unequal and 
inequitable distribution of marital property based solely on the parties' economic 
contributions to the marriage." Therefore, aside from whether the district court ignored the 
50% presumption in favor of Margee, it also abused its discretion in the present case by 
ordering a very unjust or inequitable overall result. 
The parties' marriage produced an extraordinary financial return. Yet in spite of 
Margee's contributions, virtually all of the financial success was awarded by the district court 
to Chuck. That is an unjust and inequitable result as is demonstrated by the following 
calculations based on the district court's allocation of properties as stated in Add. E, p. 809 
and Point LA. above: 
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SUMMARY OF ESTATES 
PRE-MARITAL AND POST-MARITAL 
based upon Court's Memorandum Decisions 
of February 18,2005 and April 20,2005 
Value of Total Estates at Time of Marriage: 
$1,115,000 plus $466,350 $1,581,350 
Percentage of Total Estates mitially brought to marriage by Chuck: 
$1,115,000-$1,581,350 70.5% 
Percentage of Total Estates initially brought to marriage by Margee: 
$466,360-$1,581,350 29.5% 
Value of Total Estates at Time of Trial: 
$1,762,215 plus $541,065 $2,303,280 
Percentage of Total Estates Awarded to Chuck: 
$1,762,215 -$2,303,280 76.5% 
Percentage of Total Estates Awarded to Margee: 
$541,065-$2,303,280 23.5% 
Chuck's Estate Increase in Value: 
$1,115,000 to $1,762,215 
Margee's Estate Increase in Value: 
$647,215 or 
58.0% 
$466,350 to $541,065 $74,715 or 
16.0% 
By the district court's decision, Chuck's pre-marital estate increased by $647,215 or 
58%, while Margee's pre-marital estate grew only $74,715 or 16%. Moreover, a substantial 
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portion of the small increase in the value in Margee's estate came from her 401 (k) account, 
a portion of which the district court awarded to Chuck. 
In the Dunn decision, the court held that "the trial court abused its discretion when it 
justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property based solely on the 
parties' economic contributions to the marriage." (802 P.2d 1314,1322). The court further 
concluded that the wife should have been awarded her full share of all marital property. It 
has also been held that a spouse's property award should not be measured according to the 
amount directly contributed to the financial success of the marriage, concluding that absent 
special circumstances, marital property acquired during the marriage should be equally 
divided. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1988). 
Here, the district court's decision also punishes Margee because she was unlucky 
enough that the Park City Condo which she brought to the marriage and which became 
marital property, decreased in value by $40,000 over the course of the marriage. 
It is also important to note we are not dealing with a marriage of short duration "where 
no children are bom of the marriage." Margee was pregnant with Cheyanna prior to the 
marriage, and Chuck entered into the marriage knowing full well that he had to provide a 
home for Cheyanna, regardless of the duration of the marriage. Instead of a division of the 
marital property as contemplated by law, Margee ended up with the only marital real property 
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which had depreciated in value, she was not given full credit for her equity in that property,4 
and she was given little of the marital property derived from the Marital Home. 
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by not giving Margee 50% of the 
marital property, 50% of the appreciated value of Dune Road, and 50% of the Dune Road 
rental account regardless of the characterization of the parties' properties as being either 
separate or marital. 
POINT II. EVEN USING THE "BACK OUT" METHOD OF AWARDING THE 
PARTIES' ASSETS, THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE MARGEE CREDIT FOR HER 
$135,000 EQUITY IN THE PARK CITY CONDO AT THE TIME OF 
MARRIAGE, AND MARGEE SHOULD ONLY BE CHARGED WITH 
HER PRO-RATA SHARE OF ANY DEFICIT IN THE MARITAL 
EQUITY. 
It is undisputed that at the time of the parties' marriage the Park City Condo had a 
value of $190,000 subject to a $55,000 lien, giving Margee $135,000 in equity in what 
eventually became marital property. One month after Margee brought such $ 135,000 equity 
to the marriage, Chuck paid off the $55,000 lien. Unfortunately, the Park City Condo 
decreased in value by $40,000 during the marriage, the district court having determined that 
such property was worth $150,000 as of the time of trial. 
In applying the "back out" method of distributing the parties' assets, the district court 
allowed Chuck to take back his full $55,000 contribution to the Park City Condo, but allowed 
Margee to take back only $95,000 of her $135,000 contribution. As a consequence, even 
though the parties' contributions to the Park City Condo were made within one month of each 
4
 See Point II below for further discussion of this issue. 
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other, all of the decreased value of the Park City Condo was charged to Margee. See Add. 
B, TH| 13, 18iii. What possible reason could there be why Chuck's $55,000 contribution 
should be treated preferentially compared to Margee's $135,000 contribution? Clearly, 
Margee is entitled to be credited with another $40,000 over and above the $95,000 credit she 
was given for her contribution to the Park City Condo. 
The district court also compounded the problem by charging Margee with $9,450, or 
50% of the improperly decided $18,900 short fall in the value of the parties' property, rather 
than her pro-rata share of such short fall. See Add. B, ffl[ 18iv, 19,20. Although not willing 
to give Margee 50% of the parties' marital property during the back out process, the district 
court nonetheless charged Margee with 50% of the erroneously determined deficit in the 
value of the marital property. 
Accordingly, even if the back out method of distributing the parties' assets is upheld 
on this appeal, Margee should at least be credited with her $135,000 equity in the Park City 
Condo, rather than $95,000, and she should be charged with only her pro-rata share of any 
shortfall in the value of the parties' marital property. 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
AWARD MARGEE ANY SHARE OF THE APPRECIATED VALUE OF 
DUNE ROAD AND ITS RENTAL INCOME. 
A. The evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding 
that Margee is not the reason that Chuck did not sell all of Dune Road. 
According to the district court, during the course of the parties' marriage, Dune Road 
"escalated in value tremendously" from $600,000 to $2,100,000. Chuck sold 50% of Dune 
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Road to Margee's mother for $325,000 in October of 1999, just ten (10) months after Margee 
and Chuck were married. Even after selling one-half of Dune Road, Chuck's remaining 
interest in Dune Road was worth $1,050,000 as of the time of trial, resulting in $450,000 in 
appreciated value during the time of the marriage. 
During the marriage, Dune Road also generated rental income, Chuck's 50% titular 
share of which was $19,950 as of the time of trial. The district court refused to award any 
of the appreciated value of Dune Road or any of the Dune Road rental income to Margee. 
According to well settled applicable Utah case law, ". . . trial courts making 
'equitable' property division pursuant to Section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with the rule 
prevailing in most other jurisdictions and with a division made in made in many of our own 
cases, generally award property acquired by one spouse by g;ift and inheritance during the 
marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse by his or her efforts or 
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it. Dubois v. Dubois,..." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1998), including Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion at page 310 
in which he states "I take this to be nothing more than a variation on the analogous rule 
applicable to property brought into the marriage by one party: in the usual case, that property 
is returned to that party at divorce, absent exigent circumstances. Preston v. Preston, 646 
P.2d 705,706 (Utah 1982)." Further, "The general rule is that equity requires that each party 
retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation 
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of the separate property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1168 (Utah App. 1990). However, 
exceptions to this general rule include whether the property has been co-mingled, whether 
the other spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained or protected the separate 
property and whether the distribution achieves a fair, just and equitable result. Id.; Nobel v. 
Nobel, 761 P.2d 1369,1373 (Utah 1998)." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,1320 (Utah App. 
1990). 
The district court's crucial finding of fact on the issue of Margee's entitlement to any 
part of the appreciated value of Dune Road and its rental income is found in paragraph 56 of 
the findings which reads as follows: 
Although Margee urged Chuck not to sell Dune Road, Margee 
is not the reason that Respondent did not sell all or any part of 
the property. 
Such finding informed all of the other findings the district court made in concluding 
that Margee was not entitled to any portion of the appreciation to Dune Road and its rental 
income accumulated during the marriage. The evidence clearly preponderates against such 
finding. 
Counsel for Margee are well aware that to negate such finding, Margee must marshal 
all supporting evidence, and then demonstrate that the evidence in the record clearly 
preponderates against such finding. All such marshalled evidence consists of the following: 
1. In 1975, Chuck purchased Dune Road, kept it for 23 years, paid taxes 
on it, maintained it, participated in litigation against the U.S. government and compelled the 
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government to protect the beach-front area of it, and remodeled and rebuilt the home on it 
three times, all prior to the time of the parties' marriage. (Add. A, f 38, 56, 59). 
2. At the time of the parties' marriage, Chuck was still the owner of Dune 
Road which had a then current value of $600,000. (Add. A, f 38). 
3. The fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune Road retained by Chuck is 
Chuck's separate pre-marital property. (Add. A, Yli 44, 53). 
4. Any appreciation in the value of Chuck's undivided fifty percent (50%) 
interest in Dune Road or any income generated by Chuck's interest in Dune Road since the 
parties' marriage is Chuck's pre-marital separate property. (Add. A, ff 44, 53). 
5- Chuck denied that Margee helped him keep Dune Road. (Add. D, pp. 
272,273). 
6. In Chuck's mind, Dune Road was 100% his until Margee's mother 
bought a one-half (1/2) interest. (Add. D, p. 312). 
7. Chuck could have mortgaged or sold Dune Road in 1999 to enable the 
building of the Marital Home. (Add. D, p. 412). 
The foregoing marshalled evidence is not sufficient to support the district court's 
finding that Margee is not the reason Chuck was able to keep his 50% undivided interest in 
Dune Road. The great weight of evidence is to the contrary, consisting of the following 
uncontested facts: 
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1. Feeling that he could not build the Marital Home as promised without 
additional cash, for a period of at least six (6) months during 1999, Chuck tried 
unsuccessfully to sell Dune Road for $650,000. (Add D, pp.231-234). 
2. Knowing of Chuck's desire to raise money to build the Marital Home 
as promised, and based upon her strong desire to keep Dune Road in the family as a rental 
property, investment and vacation home, in October 1999, Margee approached her mother 
Dorothy Hinkley and encouraged and begged Mrs. Hinkley to purchase a one-half interest 
in Dune Road. (App. A, f 54; Add. D, p. 155). 
3. Mrs. Hinkley agreed to such purchase and effective as of November, 
1999, Chuck and Mrs. Hinkley entered into a written agreement pursuant to which Chuck 
sold a fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune Road to Mrs. Hinkley for $325,000, which fifty 
percent (50%) interest had increased in value as of the time of trial to more than $1 Million. 
(Add. A, If 55,58). 
4. By his own admission, without selling a fifty percent (50%) interest in 
Dune Road, Chuck could not have built the Marital Home. (Add. D, pp. 235-238). 
5. As a result of Margee's facilitating the sale of fifty percent (50%) in 
Dune Road to her mother, Chuck was able to retain a fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune 
Road for over five (5) years and four (4) months up to the time of trial. (App. A, f 54). 
6. Even after selling one-half of Dune Road, Chuck's interest in Dune 
Road escalated in value tremendously by $450,000, from $600,000 as of the time of the 
marriage to $1,050,000 at the time of trial. (App. C, p. 8; App. E, pp. 807, 808). 
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7- At the time of trial, the Dune Road land by itself was worth at least $2 Million, 
and the key factors in increasing the value of Dune Road since the time of the parties' 
marriage were market forces. (App. A, f 59). 
8. According to Chuck, his option of keeping one-half of Dune Road by selling 
the other one-half to Margee's mother was a better option than selling or mortgaging all of 
Dune Road. (Add. D, p. 411). 
According to the foregoing marshalled evidence, Chuck worked very long and hard 
to acquire and preserve his 100% interest in Dune Road up to the time of the marriage. He 
got credit for that time and effort when the district court determined that Dune Road was 
worth $600,000 at the time of the parties' marriage. Chuck is responsible for the fact that he 
still owned Dune Road at the time of the marriage, and he should be given credit for that 
value. Margee makes no claim on the pre-marital value of Dune Road. 
What we are really concerned with is what happened after the parties married. The 
uncontested facts make clear that after the marriage, Dune Road increased in value 
dramatically because of the prevailing market forces, including the fact that as of the time of 
trial, the land alone was worth $2,000,000 of the $2,100,000 value of Dune Road. Of course, 
this means that after the marriage, Chuck made no contribution to the appreciated value of 
Dune Road. However, while Chuck made no such contribution, Margee saved his one-half 
interest in Dune Road by brokering the sale of the other one-hajf to her mother. 
By his own admission, Chuck could not have built the Marital Home without selling 
the one-half interest in Dune Road at $650,000, and he tried unsuccessfully to sell Dune Road 
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for a period of at least 6 months in 1999. It was at that point that Margee achieved the sale 
to her mother. Margee thus made the ultimate singular effort to preserve Dune Road by 
enabling Chuck to keep 50% of it. Her enhancement, maintenance, augmentation and 
protection of Dune Road was done at a time when Chuck was ready and willing to sell all of 
it for just $650,000. One could not do much better for Chuck than Margee did for him in 
October 1999. 
Based on the foregoing, the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record 
establishes that Margee was the reason that Chuck did not sell all of Dune Road, and 
consequently Margee is the reason why Chuck was able to enjoy a tremendous appreciation 
in the value of his retained part of Dune Road. It was an error on the part of the district court 
to rule otherwise. 
B. The evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding 
that in the future Margee will benefit greatly from Dune Road. 
In paragraph 57 of its findings, the district court states in pertinent part, as follows: 
The Petitioner has benefitted greatly from the use of the Dune 
Road property, and will in the future benefit greatly. 
Again, counsel for Margee are well aware that to negate such finding Margee must 
marshal all supporting evidence, and then demonstrate that the evidence in the record clearly 
preponderates against such finding. In this case, the only supporting evidence consists of 
Chuck's testimony wherein he stated that "She's got another $750,000 from her mother that 
I made her." There was no foundation for any such statement and Margee's counsel moved 
to strike the statement, which motion was denied. (Add. D, p. 374). 
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To the contrary was Margee's testimony, in response to a question from Chuck's 
counsel, stating that her parents had not transferred any portion of their interest in Dune Road 
to her and that she did not expect that they were going to. (Add. D, p. 155). After trial, and 
in support of Margee's motion for a new trial, Margee's understanding was confirmed by her 
mother's affidavit wherein she states that Margee is not a beneficiary of her mother's estate 
plan and will not in the future benefit from Dune Road or any of the proceeds of Dune Road. 
(Add. E, pp. 804-806). 
Margee's motion for new trial was denied, with the district court virtually conceding 
that its finding that in the future Margee would benefit from Dune Road is incorrect. At the 
June 6,2005 hearing on such motion, the district court stated "Again, I put down the issue 
you point out about something to do with inheritance - - and you're absolutely correct. I 
mean in terms of my thinking about that, but it wasn't as determinative as you argue. I seem 
to have written that it was." (Add. F, p. 26). 
Notwithstanding what the district court said in hindsight nearly four months after the 
trial, the finding at issue appeared to be very determinative at trial. Two days after the trial 
ended, the district court issued its February 18, 2005 Memorandum Decision (the "Memo 
Decision").5 In paragraph 7 at the bottom of page 6, the district court made a finding that 
" . . . petitioner is not entitled to any financial 'credit' for the retention of the Dune property." 
The Memo Decision goes on to make it clear that a substantial reason for the district court's 
5
 The complete Memo Decision is found in Add. C. 
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failure to give Margee any of the appreciated value of Dune Road is because the district court 
assumed that Margee would end up being a beneficiary of that appreciation through her 
parents. In the first sentence of the last paragraph on page 7 of the Memo Decision the 
district court wrote, "With respect to Dune, the Court finds that Petitioner has benefitted 
greatly from the use of that property, and will in the future benefit greatly." Beginning in the 
fourth line at the top of page 8 of the Memo Decision, the district court wrote, "Ultimately, 
that increase will likely inure to the benefit of Petitioner in terms of inheritance, though there 
was no testimony about her siblings or the estate plan of her parents. Still, the Court believes 
that any benefit Petitioner conferred on the property has and will be outweighed by any 
benefits she has and will continue to receive." Then again, emphasizing the importance of 
such findings in its mind, in the seventh line at the top of page 9 the district court returned 
to the proposition a third time and stated, "As noted, Petitioner has benefitted and will benefit 
in other ways from the appreciation of the value of the property." The district court 
memorialized this same finding in paragraph 57 as quoted above. 
Based on such findings, the district court decided to compensate Margee for "any 
benefit she conferred on" Dune Road out of her parent's (technically, her mother's) share of 
Dune Road. As to the benefit Margee conferred on Dune Road, the evidence is 
uncontroverted that the benefit was substantial. It consisted of the $325,000 value of 
Chuck's 50% of Dune Road at the time of the sale of the other 50% to Margee's mother, with 
that $325,000 increasing in value up to $ 1,050,000, or an increase of $725,000, over a period 
of five years and four months. That is a lot of benefit with respect to which the district court 
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concluded that it would be outweighed by "any benefits she has and will continue to receive." 
That Margee will receive no future benefits from Dune Road as the district court originally 
determined, demonstrates the unfairness of denying her any part of the appreciated value of 
Dune Road and the Dune Road rental account. Yet such original determination was 
obviously a huge factor in not awarding Margee anything with respect to Dune Road. It 
should be noted also, that it was a huge factor in a case which the district court found difficult 
to decide. (See the first paragraph in the district court's conclusions at the top of page 14 of 
the Memo Decision.) 
What we are left with is the fact that Margee will not enjoy any future benefit from 
Dune Road as the district court found. We are also left with the devastating result of such 
finding which is that the $725,000 benefit conferred by Margee is outweighed by virtually 
nothing in return. That cannot be viewed as a fair and equitable result, and the district court 
abused its discretion by allowing that to happen. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
In summary, the district court awarded the properties at issue as follows: 
Value at Time 
Marital Property of Trial Awarded to Chuck Awarded to Margee 
$263,000 Account $263,000 $248,450 $14,550 
Kate Road 381,000 381,000 0 
Park City Condo 150,000 150,000 
Three Automobiles 33,600 33,600 0 
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4 Wheeler 2.000 2.000 0 
Subtotal: $829,600 $665,050 $164,550 
Dune Road 
Appreciated Value 450,000 450,000 0 
($1,050,000-600,000) 
Dune Road 
Rental Account 19,950 19,950 0 
TOTAL AWARDED $1.299.550 $1.135.000 $164.550 
Based on the foregoing materials, the district court should have awarded such 
properties as follows: 
Value at Time 
Marital Property of Trial Award to Chuck Award to Margee 
$263,000 Account $263,000 $144,225 $118,775 
Kate Road 381,000 0 381,000 
Park City Condo 150,000 0 150,000 
Three Automobiles 33,600 33,600 0 
4 Wheeler 2.000 2.000 0 
Subtotal: $829,600 $179,825 $649,775 
Dune Road 
Appreciated Value 450,000 450,000 0 
($1,050,000-600,000) 
Dune Road 
Rental Account 19,950 19,950 0 
TOTAL AWARDED $1.299.550 $649.775 $649.775 
In the recent case of Keene v. Bosner, 107 P.3d 693 (2005 Utah App. 37), it was held 
that remand to the trial court is not necessary when there are no longer any facts in dispute, 
and that under such circumstances the appellate court can render judgment based upon the 
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facts as finally determined. Such is the case here. Margee therefore requests that this court 
issue its order awarding her $118,775 of the $263,000 Account, Kate Road at a value of 
$3 81,000, plus the Park City Condo at a value of $ 150,000. Alternatively, Margee requests 
that the court issue its order awarding judgment in favor of Margee and against Chuck in the 
amount of the $485,225 difference between what she was awarded and what she should have 
been awarded ($649,775 less $164,550), plus post-judgment interest thereon from and after 
April 29,2005. 
DATED this Si4) day of December, 2005. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBR OOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
Bv IC^*^-
Kent B Linebaugh 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 2005,1 caused to be sent, via 
hand-delivery, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING 
BRIEF to the following: 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
170 South Main Street 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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723618vl -38-
ADDENDUM 
723618vl 
-39-
ADDENDUM A 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
ROGER D. SANDACK (2856) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Facsimile: (801) 531-1486 
Attorney for Respondent 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2? 2005 
SALT 
By-^ 
LAKEC0pfcTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE M. HAYES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ARTHUR C.HAYES, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.04-4906384DA 
(formerly Summit County 03-
0500242DA) 
Judge Brace C. Lubeck 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
The above-captioned action came on for trial before the court on February 15 and 16, 
2005, Petitioner Marjorie M. Hayes (Margee), having been represented by Kent B Linebaugh, 
Esq., of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough PC, and Respondent Arthur C. Hayes (Chuck), 
having been represented by Roger D. Sandack, Esq., and, the court having heard the testimony of 
witnesses, having examined the other proofs offered by the parties and, received by the Court, 
and having heard the arguments of counsel, and the matter having been submitted to the court for 
decision, and the Court having rendered a Memorandum Decision dated February 18,2005, and 
Petitioner having objected to the Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Decree submitted by the 
Respondent, and the parties having argued the same to this Court on April 20,2005, and the 
Court having rendered a subsequent Memorandum Decision, and the court being otherwise fully 
advised of the premises, now, on Motion of Roger D. Sandack, attorney for Respondent, the 
court makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties are actual and bone fide residents of Summit County, State of Utah, 
and have been for at least three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Margee and Chuck are husband and wife having been married on December 20, 
1998, in Valley Forge, State of Pennsylvania. This marriage is the first marriage for each of the 
parties. 
3. This action was commenced, and Margee and Chuck separated, on or about 
November 3,2003. The parties were married for approximately five years as of the date of 
separation and six years as of the date of trial. The marriage is one of short duration between two 
older parties both of whom held substantial pre-marital property. 
4. During the course of their marriage the parties have experienced irreconcilable 
differences that prevent the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. 
5. Margee's date of birth is May 28,1957, making her 47 years of age at the time of 
trial. 
6. Chuck's date of birth is December 14,1944, making him 60 years of age at the 
time of trial. 
7. Margee holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from Southern 
Methodist University. 
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& In 1968 Chuck received a BS degree from Michigan State University in liberal 
arts, with economics as a minor. 
9. On or about 1969, Chuck accepted employment with Chemical Bank in 
Manhattan, New York, which employment continued for approximately 10 years. 
10. In 1970 Chuck attended the Harvard Business School for a multi-week course 
under the auspices of his bank employment at that time. 
11. During his employment by Chemical Bank, Chuck held several different positions 
ending up as a Vice President in charge of the bank's agribusiness group, the objective of which 
was to lend money and provide financial services to large corporate 500 companies in the 
agriculture industry. 
12. During the course of performing his duties as Vice President of the bank's 
agribusiness group, Chuck was involved in real estate transactions involving mortgages and other 
types of loans. 
13. The parties first met in the State of New York in the early summer of 1998 and 
Chuck moved to Park City, Utah to live with Margee in about July 1998. 
PARENTING PLAN 
14. Prior to the parties' marriage, Margee was pregnant with the parties' child, 
Cheyanna Hayes ("Cheyanna") bom July 19,1999, and Cheyanna was five years of age at the 
time of trial. 
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15. There are no other children born as issue of the parties' marriage, and none are 
expected. 
16. The parties have agreed on a parenting plan as contemplated by UCA § 30-3-10.9, 
a copy of which parenting plan is attached hereto as the provisions of which are contained in 
these Findings. 
17. Each of the parties have attended the Mandatory Educational Course for 
Divorcing Parents as contemplated by UCA § 30-3-11.3, and each of them has received and filed 
a Certificate of Completion evidencing completion of such course. 
18. Margee is a fit a proper person and as,the natural mother of Cheyanna, Margee 
should be designated as the custodial parent of Cheyanna subject to Chuck's parent-time rights. 
19. Since their separation, the parties have had joint legal custody of Cheyanna, and 
Margee has had physical custody of Cheyanna, subject to Chuck's parent-time rights. 
20. Because of her seniority with her employer, Margee's work schedule is very 
flexible enabling her to be home virtually every night. 
21. The parties are currently observing a parent-time schedule entitling Chuck as the 
noncustodial parent to parent-time with Cheyanna consisting of 12 to 16 days per month, 
together with one overnight stay per week, a sharing of weekends and holidays and otherwise as 
contemplated pursuant to UCA § 30-3-35, and the parties have agreed to continue to observe 
such parent-time schedule. To the extent that the parties' monthly schedule can be reasonably 
anticipated, the monthly schedule should be established before each month and should 
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accommodate both parties anticipated needs, hi the event either party wishes to change the 
schedule or fails to provide reasonable notification to the other of the need for such changes, the 
party failing to notify shall pay all costs associated with such change, for example, day-care, 
meals and transportation, etc. 
The parties have further agreed: 
a. That the parties understand the importance of parent time with their 
child. Both parties shall use their best efforts to ensure that parent time occurs consistently. 
b. That it is fair and reasonable that the parties have the child ready when 
the other picks up the child for his or her parent time. 
c. That it is fair and reasonable that each party return the child on time 
after his or her parent time. 
d. That it is fair and reasonable that either party contact the other if there is 
delay for pick up or delivery of the child for any reason. 
e. That the parties acknowledge that their relationship as the child's parents 
will continue for many years. Despite their personal differences, the parties agree to support 
each other as parents in establishing and enforcing consistent rules and discipline in their 
respective households regarding homework, lessons, school projects, and general conduct. 
f • That the parties agree to consult each other if either of them becomes 
aware that their child is experiencing difficulties in school, emotional problems or other 
problems. 
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g. That the parties agree to hold the other in high esteem in their 
conversations with the child, and to encourage her continuing love and affection for both 
parents. In no event shall either party demean or disparage the other parent, or discuss this 
matter in the child's presence, or permit any third party to do so. 
h. That the parties agree to notify one another and provide one another with 
copies of the child's school schedules, extracurricular activities, special events, team and 
individual sports, lessons, church activities, school activities, and parent teacher conferences. 
i. That the parties agree that both parents shall attend and participate in all 
of the child's activities whenever possible. 
j . That the parties agree to provide one another with copies of all report 
cards, school pictures, and all other significant documents and items related to the child. 
k. That the parties shall have foil access to the child's school teachers, 
religion teachers, coaches, other teachers, instructors, health care providers, school records 
and medical records. 
1. That the parties shall be entitled to reasonable unmonitored telephone 
contact with the child. 
m. That both parties agree to keep each other informed of his or her address 
and telephone numbers at all times. 
n. That both parties agree to notify the other whenever he or she intends to 
take the child on any overnight trip exceeding two nights, and to provide the other with a 
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travel itinerary with addresses and telephone numbers where he or she may be reached in the 
event of an emergency. 
o. That both parties agree to immediately notify one another of all medical 
emergencies, reasons for which the child may miss school, and legal problems of the child. 
p. That no proceedings involving the custody of the minor child have been 
filed or are pending in this Court or any other Court. 
q. That the Petitioner is not receiving public assistance for the benefit of the 
minor child. 
r. That it is fair and reasonable that Utah Code Annotated §30-3-32, §30-3-
33 and §30-3-37 be incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. 
s. That it is fair and reasonable that child support be paid on the 1st day of 
each and every month. 
t. That it is fair and reasonable that the Petitioner be awarded said child 
support until the minor child reaches the age of eighteen or graduates from high school with 
her normal and expected graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
u. That it is fair and reasonable that the Respondent assume and pay all 
child care expenses he incurs when he is exercising his parent time. 
v. That it is fair and reasonable that the Petitioner assume and pay all child 
care expenses she incurs when she is exercising her parent time. 
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w. That it is fair and reasonable that the Respondent be given the 
opportunity to exercise parent time if the Petitioner is unable to exercise parent time and prior 
to contacting an alternative child care provider. 
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CHILD SUPPORT AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS 
22. For the purpose of determining gross income as contemplated by 
UCA § 78-45-7.5, Margee has been employed as a flight attendant by Delta Airlines ("Delta") for 
over twenty-five (25) years, and her current monthly gross income for determining her share of 
the base combined child support obligation to be provided on behalf Cheyanna is $3,200. 
23. For the purpose of determining gross income as contemplated by 
UCA § 78-45-7.5, Chuck has been a self-employed real estate developer for approximately 
twenty-five (25) years and his monthly gross income for determining his share of the base 
combined child support obligation to be provided on behalf of Cheyanna is not less than $7,000. 
24. As to Respondent's income, the Respondent has been less than forthright and 
candid. While he expressed a genuine love for his child and a desire to support his child, which 
he has done during the pendency of this action, the Court has been given less than ideal 
information from which to impute income. From time to time, Chuck has earned income over 
and above what is reflected in his tax returns. Respondent's answers about his income are not 
believable and in some other areas are less than fully beUevable. Respondent indicates he has no 
income whatever at present, has done no real estate deals in several years, yet somehow has 
various automobiles, pays child support, and evidently otherwise lives a life of his choosing. He 
indicates he cannot work, yet the Court sees no observable reasons for that statement. The Court 
finds that Petitioner is credible in most regards, but finds generally she was willing to state values 
of properties that are not fully justified. 
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25. The Court otherwise incorporates it's comments in the Memorandum Decision 
into these Findings of Fact, including those comments necessary to support imputation of 
income for child support purposes. 
26. Pursuant to UCA § 78-45-7.14, the monthly base combined child support 
obligation of the parties to Cheyanna is $826, Margee's share of which support is $260 and 
Chuck's share of which support is $567, which amount is consistent with the Statewide Child 
Support Guidelines. 
27. Margee is entitled to a base child support award from Chuck in the amount of 
$567 per month, which shall be due and payable on the first day of each calendar month, 
commencing March 1,2005. 
28. Through her employment with Delta, Margee has health insurance available for 
the medical expenses of Cheyanna, which insurance is available at a reasonable cost, which cost 
is currently $127.33 per month, and Margee should be ordered to continue to maintain and pay 
for such insurance so long as such insurance is available through her employment. 
29. Beginning with the month of March, 2005, Margee is entitled to a health 
insurance award from Chuck equal to fifty percent (50%) of Margee's out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by her for Cheyanna's portion of such insurance, which fifty percent 
(50%) is currently $63.67 per month, and which payment should be made by Chuck to Margee 
on or before the first day of each calendar month commencing March 1,2005. 
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30. Each of the parties should be required to share equally in the payment of all 
reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses, including deductibles and co-
payments, incurred for or on behalf of Cheyanna. 
31. Either of the parties who incur uninsured medical and dental expenses with 
respect to Cheyanna shall provide written verification of the costs and payments of such expenses 
to the other party within thirty (30) days of any such payment. 
32. Margee is entitled to recover from Chuck monthly base child support and monthly 
payments of fifty percent (50%) of Cheyanna's health insurance premiums until Cheyanna 
reaches the age of eighteen or graduates from high school in her normal year, whichever occurs 
last. 
33. Following the November 12,2003 hearing on the court's then pending order to 
show cause, Chuck was ordered to pay to Margee one hundred percent (100%) of the health 
insurance premiums with respect to the health insurance provided to Chuck through Margee's 
employment. 
34. For the month of November 2003 and for each calendar month thereafter through 
February 2005, a total of sixteen (16) months, Margee has provided and paid for health insurance 
benefits for Chuck at an out-of-pocket cost to her of $39.83 per month for the first two (2) 
months, and $10433 per month for the next twelve (12) months, and $12733 per month for the 
last two (2) months, or a total of $1,586.28, no part of which costs have been paid to her by 
Chuck. 
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35. Margee is entitled to a health insurance award from Chuck in the amount of 
$1,586.28, payable forthwith. 
PREMARITAL PROPERTY 
36. Just prior to their marriage, the parties agreed that after their marriage Chuck 
would continue with his real estate development business and provide a home for the family, and 
that Margee would continue to work as a flight attendant and provide steady income and valuable 
employment benefits for their family. 
37. Respondent owned a residence in Quogue, New York, which was sold just prior 
to his marriage. The proceeds were deposited in his individual account at Suffock County 
National Bank, and then transferred by CD to his individual First Security Bank, Utah account, 
in the amount of $349,000. A substantial portion of the proceeds from the sale of this home 
were used towards the purchase of the lot and construction of the home located at 938 Aerie 
Drive (the*Aerie home*), Park City, Utah, and to payoff the mortgage on Margee's Park City 
Condo. 
38. At the time of their marriage, Chuck was the owner of that certain residential 
rental property located at 917 Dune Road, West Hampton Beach, New York ("Dune Road"), 
which property had a then current value of $600,000, purchased in 1975 and remodeled and 
rebuilt three times between 1980 and the time of the marriage. In October, 1999, Respondent 
sold half of his interest in this property to Petitioner's parents for the sum of $325,000, all of 
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which was deposited into his individual bank account and which was used for the construction 
of the Aerie home and living expenses. 
39. At the time of the marriage the Respondent owned a lot in Florida, which 
Respondent sold on February 5, 1999, for the sum of $117,000. The net proceeds of 
$106,632.77 were deposited into Respondent's individual bank account. A substantial portion 
of that money was subsequently used for the purchase and construction of the Aerie Drive 
home. 
40. At the time of the marriage the Respondent had cash proceeds located in New 
York banks and transferred to First Security Bank of Utah in the approximate amount of 
$60,000.00. 
41. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a condominium 
located in Chicago, Illinois (the "Chicago Condo"), which property had a then current value of 
approximately $88,500, less an indebtedness against the property in the amount of approximately 
$28,500, or a then current net value of $60,000. 
42. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of that certain 
condominium located at 1525 Park Avenue, Park City, Utah, (the "Park City Condo"), which 
property had a then current value of $190,000, less an indebtedness against the property in the 
amount of approximately $55,000, or a then current net value of $135,000. 
43. Shortly after the marriage the Respondent paid off the indebtedness against the 
Park City Condo in the amount of $55,000. That payment was not a "gift" but was done as a part 
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of the marriage and because it made economic sense, as the interest rate was 9%, and allowed the 
condo to be rented at a profit. 
44. At the time of the parties* marriage, Margee was the owner of a long-term 
leasehold interest in that certain single family dwelling located at 413 Warm Springs Road, 
Ketchum, Idaho (the "Sun Valley Property"), which property had a then current value of 
$195,000, less an indebtedness against the property in the amount of approximately $105,000, or 
a then current net value of $90,000. Respondent has performed incidental duties, including the 
management of the Idaho property over the four years of their marriage, however, similar to 
the increases experienced in the Dune Road property in West Hampton, this property increased 
in value as a result of market forces rather than the result of management and/or simple 
maintenance. Accordingly the Court finds this property is Petitioner's pre-marital property 
and should not be included as marital property in this marriage, and the 917 Dune Road, West 
Hampton, New York, property is the pre-marital and separate the property of Respondent. 
45. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a Delta Credit 
Union savings account (the 'Delta Savings Account") which had a then current value of $14,300. 
46. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a Delta Credit 
Union checking account (the "Delta Checking Account") which had a then current value of 
$3,700. 
47. At the time of the parties* marriage, Margee was the owner of a Delta Credit 
Union Employee 401 (k) Account (the "401 (k) Account") which had a then current value of 
14 
$126,150. On or about December 26,1998, Margee designated Chuck as a primary beneficiary of 
the 401 (k) Account, and he was still the primary beneficiary on the 401 (k) Account as of the date 
of trial, which designation will change upon dissolution of the marriage. 
48. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of Delta Airlines stock 
(the "Delta Stock'') which had a then current value of $4,900. 
49. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a Sequoia 
Investment Fund account (the "Sequoia Fund") which had a then current value of $3,500. 
50. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a Sequoia IRA 
account (the "Sequoia IRA") which had a then current value of $14,550. 
51. At the time of the parties* marriage, Margee was the owner of a checking account 
at Wells Fargo Bank maintained with respect to the income and expenses generated from renting 
the Sim Valley Property (the "Sun Valley Rental Account"), which had a then current value of 
$2,250. 
52. At the time of the parties' marriage, Margee was the owner of a 1994 Subaru 
Legacy automobile ("Margee's Car") which had a then current value of $12,000. 
DUNE ROAD PROPERTY 
53. Prior to the marriage Respondent acquired a property located at 917 Dune Road, 
New York, 11978. The Court finds this property and any appreciation to or income derived from 
this property is the non-marital and pre-marital property of the Respondent and all of his interest 
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in West Hampton Beach property should be awarded to him free and clear of any claim by the 
Petitioner. 
54. Knowing of Chuck's desire to raise money to build the Marital Home, and based 
on her strong desire to keep Dune Road in the family as a rental property and vacation home, in 
October, 1999, Margee approached her mother, Dorothy Hinckley, and encouraged Mrs. 
Hinckley to purchase a one-half interest in Dune Road. 
55. Effective as of November, 1999, Chuck and Mrs, Hinckley, entered into a written 
agreement pursuant to which Chuck sold a fifty percent (50%) interest in Dune Road to Mrs. 
Hinckley for $325,000, which was paid in foil by February of 2000. 
56. While Petitioner encouraged Respondent not to sell the Dune property because it 
was a desirable location for vacation and a good investment, the decision to retain Dune and sell 
other properties was a business decision of the Respondent and Petitioner is not entitled to any 
financial "credit" for the retention of the Dune property. Respondent bought that property in 
1975; he remodeled and rebuilt it, paid taxes on it, maintained it, and kept it a valuable property 
for 23 years before the marriage. Although Margee urged Chuck not to sell Dime Road, Margee 
is not the reason that Respondent did not sell all or any part of the property. 
57. The Petitioner has benefited greatly from the use of the Dune Road property, and 
will in the future benefit greatly. The Court finds that Petitioner did not augment the property 
sufficiently to become entitled to share in the appreciation of the value of the Dime property. 
16 
58. Petitioner has used the Dune Road property for as much as four months per year; 
she has taken friends and family for pleasure; her parents purchased a one-half interest which, at 
the current value, will cause their share to increase from the $325,000 purchase price to greater 
than $1 million. 
59. The Court finds that the land alone on Dune Road is worth at least $2 million. The 
key factor in the elevation of the value has been market forces coupled with the decision of the 
U.S. government to protect the beach front area, compelled by litigation in which Respondent 
participated. 
60. The Court further finds that Petitioner exceeded her authority in allowing a lease 
on the Dune property, which the Court finds Petitioner did without approval of Respondent. 
MARITAL PROPERTY 
A. Aerie Home 
61. On or about February 1,1999, the parties jointly decided to purchase the building 
lot at 938 Aerie Drive, Park City, Utah, on which to construct a home for the family (the "Marital 
Home"). Margee helped with the construction of the Marital home by participating in its design, 
cleaning, and selecting some of the materials and furnishings that went into the marital home. 
62. Chuck acted as the general contractor with respect to the construction of the 
Marital Home. 
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63. During the marriage the parties acquired a residence located at 938 Aerie Drive. 
The purchase of which lot and the construction of the home, under the general supervision of 
Respondent, cost $700,000. 
64. The Aerie home sold on or about February 24, 2004, for the net sum of 
$711,628 producing, after deduction of liens, the amount of $277,752.58 in cash proceeds, and 
ownership of a lot on Little Kate Road, Park City, Utah worth $381,000. 
65. Respondent contributed non-marital property to the purchase of the lot in the 
amount of $165,000 and the construction of the home in the amount of $454,000. These 
monies were derived directly from the sale other properties which Respondent had owned prior 
to the marriage. 
66. During the course of the parties' construction of the marital home, Margee 
contributed over $79,000 in cash and materials to accomplish such construction. 
67. The Court finds that it is fair and reasonable that both parties be awarded their 
pre-marital and non-marital contributions to the Aerie home and the remaining amount, if any, 
shall represent the parties* marital equity in the Aerie home. 
68. Margee helped with construction of the Marital Home by participating in its 
design, cleaning, and selecting some of the materials and furnishings that went into the Marital 
Home. 
69. On or about February 1,2000, the parties and Cheyanna moved into the Marital 
Home. 
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70. On or about January 15,2003, acting on behalf of himself and Margee, but 
without Margee's knowledge or consent, Chuck applied for a $300,000 line of credit with 
Washington Mutual Bank (the "Line of Credit"), which Line of Credit was to be secured by the 
Marital Home. 
71. In the process of applying for the Line of Credit, Chuck represented that he had 
rental income from Dune Road and provided to the bank copies of the first pages of the May 
2001 and May 2002 leases of Dune Road. 
72. In the process of applying for the Line of Credit, Chuck represented to the bank 
that Margee and he had gross rental income from the Sun Valley Property in the amount of 
$1,250 per month. 
73. In the process of applying for the Line of Credit, Chuck submitted to the bank a 
copy of the October 1,2002 lease of the Sun Valley Property, which lease showed both Margee 
and Chuck as the lessors of the property, even though Chuck did not then and never has had any 
interest in the Sun Valley Property. 
74. In the process of applying for the Line of Credit, Chuck represented to the bank 
that Margee and he had additional rental income from the Park City Condo. 
75. In the process of applying for the Line of Credit, Chuck represented to the bank 
that Margee's total gross monthly salary was $3,333.00, and provided to the bank copies of 
Margee's W-2 forms for both 2001 and 2002. 
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76. On or about February 4,2003, the Line of Credit was approved by the bank which 
included Chuck's gross monthly rental income of $6,041.00 consisting of $4,791.67 from Dune 
Road and $1,250.00 from the Sun Valley Property, plus Margee's total gross monthly salary of 
$1,275.00. 
77. In connection with consummating the Line of Credit, Chuck affixed Margee's 
signature or initials on the following ten (10) documents, on or about the dates indicated: 
a. January 15,2003, IMPORTANT TERMS OF OUR 
HOME EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT; 
b. January 15,2003, NOTICE OF INSURANCE REQUIREMENT; 
c. January 25,2003, ANTI-COERCION DISCLOSURE; 
d. February 4,2003, COMMITMENT LETTER; 
e. February 19,2003, BORROWER'S AFFIDAVIT; 
f. February 19,2003, VERIFICATION OF 
IMPORTANT LOAN INFORMATION; 
g. Eebruary 19,2003, REQUEST FOR VERIFICATION 
OF TAYPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER; 
h. February 19,2003, NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL; 
i. February 19,2003, HOUSE HOME EQUITY 
LINE OF CREDIT AGREEMENT AND 
DISCLOSURE (paragraph 2 of which purported 
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to obligate both Chuck and Margee to pay to the 
bank up to $300,000 on the Line of Credit); 
j . February 19,2003, EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT DEED 
OF TRUST (paragraph 3 of which stated that both 
Chuck and Margee were owners of the Marital Home 
which was hypothecated as security for the Line of 
Credit); 
78. The Line of Credit was applied for and made available without Margee's 
knowledge or consent. At no time did Margee ever authorize Chuck to sign her signature or 
initials on the line of credit. 
79. The Court finds that the basis for Respondents actions as set forth above was not 
because he needed Petitionees income to qualify for this loan. The Aerie property had substantial 
value, over $700,000, and a line of credit was available without income to support it. The 
Petitioner's name was on these loan documents because Washington Mutual requested such, 
even though title was in Respondent's name only, at the time of the Application. The Respondent 
did not do anything improper in a legal sense in affixing Petitioner's name to the documents, 
even though it was clearly improper and unwise and unthinking, in terms of the marriage. The 
use of Petitioner's name did not commingle the property. 
80. On or about September 5,2003, Chuck signed, acknowledged and delivered for 
recording a Quit Claim Deed, dated as of March 2003, pursuant to which deed he conveyed his 
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interest in the Marital Home to himself and Margee as joint tenants, which deed was recorded on 
September 8,2003. The deed from Respondent to the parties jointly was done at the behest of 
Washington Mutual, who indicated that it would then have a deed conveying the property back 
from Margee and Chuck to the Respondent. Respondent had no knowledge of the fact that 
Petitioner did not sign the deed conveying the property back to Respondent, until after he entered 
into a contract to sell the home. 
81. On or about September 9,2003, Chuck and Coldwell Banker Residential 
Brokerage entered into a listing agreement pursuant to which Chuck agreed to sell the Marital 
Home at a price of $829,000, and in which listing Chuck was listed as the sole seller. 
82. On or about September 23,2003, Chuck signed an offer to purchase that certain 
residential building lot located at 1211 Little Kate Road, Park City, Utah ("Kate Road") for a 
purchase price of $375,000, which offer was accepted as of that date. 
83. At no time prior to Chuck agreeing to purchase Kale Road did he discuss such 
purchase with Margee nor take Margee to see the property, even though he intended to build a 
new family home on Kate Road. 
84. Margee did not find out that Chuck had contracted to purchase Kate Road until on 
or about September 27,2003. 
85. In anticipation of the sale of the Aerie property, Respondent, on September 23, 
2003, acquired an unimproved piece of land located on Little Kate Road in Park City, Utah. 
The land was purchased by Respondent for the sum of $375,000. The purchase price was 
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$100,000 down, paid from the line of credit on Aerie, and the remaining $275,000 was to be 
paid from the sale proceeds of the Aerie home. The Court finds the present value of the Little 
Kate lot is $381,000. 
86. The Court finds and concludes that the failure to communicate about the 
purchase of Little Kate and the sale of Aerie were the fault of both parties, not just the 
Respondent. Accordingly, the Court's previous finding of contempt as to Respondent should 
be vacated. 
87. Upon learning that Chuck had agreed to sell the Marital Home and some of the 
parties furniture in the home, Margee objected and refused to agree to such sale. 
88. On or about February 25,2004, a representative of the prospective buyer of the 
Marital Home advised counsel for Margee in writing that if the sale of the Marital Home did not 
close by March 1,2004, the buyer would sue Chuck and Margee for specific performance, and 
that the $10,000 escrow deposit would be in jeopardy if the Marital Home was not totally vacated 
by March 1,2004. 
89. In an effort to resolve the issues that arose as a result of Chuck's failure to inform 
Margee or allow her to participate in the negotiation of any sale of the Marital Home, including 
any of their furniture, Margee participated in a lengthy mediation in an effort to resolve the 
issues, and incurred the expense of her fifty percent (50%) share of the cost of such mediation. 
90. After expending significant time, incurring significant attorney fees, and meeting 
with realtors and closing agents to gain information on the issues and risks presented by such 
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purported contract, to which she was not a party, Margee agreed to the sale contemplated by such 
contract in order to avoid threatened litigation from the buyer and realtors against both Chuck 
and Margee. 
91. Out of the proceeds of the sale of the Marital Home, the balance owing on Kate 
Road was paid in the amount of not less than $280,688. 
92. hi June of 2004, without any notice to Margee, Chuck sold some of the parties 
furniture and furnishings through a consignment store for $3,195.00 netting to him $1,877.00, no 
amount of which has been paid to Margee. Margee's half share equals $938.50 for which she 
should be entitled to judgment. 
93. During the Respondent's work-life history he has never vested or invested in a 
retirement accountr a 401K account, any deferred compensation or pension accounts. He has 
qualified for a nominal Social Security retirement at age 65. Respondent's sole source of 
revenue and virtually his only asset for retirement is the equity he has built from the purchase, 
renovation, sale and trade of residential real properties between 1974 and the present date. 
b. Park City condominium 
94. Prior to the marriage Petitioner owned a condominium located at 1524 Park 
Avenue, Park City, Utah. In December, 1999 Petitioner voluntarily executed a quit-claim 
deed naming the Respondent as a joint-owner of that property following Respondent's January, 
1999 payment, in full, of the remaining mortgage on Petitioner's Park City condominium 
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property in the amount of about $55,000. The present value of the parties' condominium is 
$150,000. 
95. Beginning in July of 1998 and through January of 2000, the parties lived in the 
Park City Condo as their marital residence 
96. From February 1,2000 through November of 2001, and again from April 1,2002 
through August 2003, the Park City Condo was rental property generating rental income for the 
parties. 
97. From December 1,2001 and through March 2002, the parties lived in the Park 
City Condo as their marital residence, during which time, the Marital Home was rented for the 
2002 Winter Olympics, from which the parties received net rental income of approximately 
$40,000. 
98. During the course of the parties marriage, they lived in the Park City Condo as 
their marital residence a total of 22 months while the Marital Home was being constructed or 
when it was being rented out during the 2002 Winter Olympics. 
99. The Court finds Respondent has paid the taxes on the properties, including the 
Park City condo, and has paid substantial sums toward family expenses for utilities and family 
activities for the family and the child, and has paid many expenses of the marriage that also 
conferred a major benefit on the Petitioner throughout the marriage, 
100. Since on or about November 3,2003, the Park City Condo has been the residence 
of Margee and Cheyanna. 
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101. The Court finds the Park City condo is marital property. 
c. Little Kate Lot 
102. In September, 2003, prior to the parties separation and the filing of divorce in 
this matter, Respondent purchased a lot located at 1125 Little Kate Road, Park City, Utah, for 
the purpose of ultimately building a residential real property, as he has done for the last 25-30 
years. The property was purchased for the sum of $375,000, with Respondent advancing the 
sum of $100,000 from an equity line of credit obtained off the Aerie Drive property, and a 
note executed for the balance, payable upon sale of the Aerie property home. 
d. Automobiles 
103. The parties acquired during the course of the marriage three automobiles, a 1998 
Land Rover automobile, for $16,585, which has a current market value of $9,900; a 2002 
Chevrolet Avalanche for $29,805, which automobile has a current value of approximately 
$22,500; and a 1993 Ford Taurus with a current value of $1,200, all of which is marital property. 
The parties also acquired a four wheeler having a value of $2000. 
Aerie House sale 
104. The Aerie property sold for a reasonable sum following the filing of this Action. 
From the sale proceeds of the Aerie property, the following amounts were deducted all with 
full knowledge of the parties; 
a. $158,000 to reimburse the equity line of credit against the Aerie 
property. 
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b. $275,000 owed on the note for Little Kate Road. 
c. certain taxes and maintenance for Chuck. 
105. The remaining proceeds, from the sale of Aerie are as follows: 
a. An escrow account at Zion's Bank in the amount of $263,000. 
b. Equity in the Little Kate property valued at $381,000. 
106. Margee's Car has a current value of approximately $ 1,600, which is Margee's 
separate property. 
107. The Delta Savings Account has a current value of approximately $3,075, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
108. The Delta Checking Account has a current value of approximately $725, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
109. The Sun Valley Rental Account has a current value of approximately $975, which 
is Margee's separate property. 
110. The current value of Margee's 401(k) Account is approximately $180,580, 
$126,150 of which is Margee's separate property and $54,430 of which is marital property. 
111. The current value of the Delta Stock is approximately $3,575, which is Margee's 
separate property. 
112. The current value of the Sequoia Fund is approximately $12,000, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
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113. The current value of the Sequoia IRA is approximately $19,200, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
114. During the course of the parties' marriage, Margee's mother gifted to her common 
stock (the "Gift Stock"), and the current value of such stock is approximately $5,000, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
115. Any contributions made to Margee's retirement, pension or deferred 
compensation plan or plans during the marriage are marital propeirty, subject to division between 
the parties pursuant to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders. 
116. Each party has in his or her possession all remaining furniture, furnishings and 
personal property acquired during the marriage and each should be awarded that personal 
property in their possession free and clear of any claims by the other. 
117. The Court finds that all previous findings of contempt are vacated. No findings of 
contempt are entered and all requests for contempt are denied. 
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court sets forth the following principles and as guidance for the Court, 
a. When a marriage is of short duration, the Court may consider restoring 
each party to the condition of the party of the time of the marriage, where no children are bom 
of the marriage. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ROGER D. SANDACK (2856) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Facsimile: (801) 531-1486 
Attorney for Respondent 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 19 2005 
SALT LAKE C0tJfoTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE M. HAYES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ARTHUR C.HAYES, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 04-4906384DA 
(formerly Summit County 03-
0500242DA) 
Judge Brace C. Lubeck 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
The above-captioned action came on for trial before the court on February 15 and 16, 
2005, Petitioner Marjorie M. Hayes (Margee), having been represented by Kent B Linebaugh, 
Esq., of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough PC, and Respondent Arthur C. Hayes (Chuck), 
having been represented by Roger D. Sandack, Esq., and, the court having heard the testimony of 
witnesses, having examined the other proofs offered by the parties and, received by the Court, 
and having heard the arguments of counsel, and the matter having been submitted to the court for 
decision, and the Court having rendered a Memorandum Decision dated February 18,2005, and 
Petitioner having objected to the Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Decree submitted by the 
Respondent, and the parties having argued the same to this Court on April 20,2005, and the 
Court having rendered a subsequent Memorandum Decision, and the court being otherwise folly 
113. The current value of the Sequoia IRA is approximately $19,200, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
114. During the course of the parties' marriage, Margee's mother gifted to her common 
stock (the "Gift Stock"), and the current value of such stock is approximately $5,000, which is 
Margee's separate property. 
115. Any contributions made to Margee's retirement, pension or deferred 
compensation plan or plans during the marriage are marital property, subject to division between 
the parties pursuant to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders. 
116. Each party has in his or her possession all remaining furniture, furnishings and 
personal property acquired during the marriage and each should be awarded that personal 
property in their possession free and clear of any claims by the other. 
117. The Court finds that all previous findings of contempt are vacated. No findings of 
contempt are entered and all requests for contempt are denied. 
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court sets forth the following principles and as guidance for the Court. 
a. When a marriage is of short duration, the Court may consider restoring 
each party to the condition of the party of the time of the marriage, where no children are born 
of the marriage. 
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b. Each party is presumed entitled to all of his or her separate property and 
half of the marital property. Where separate property is augmenled or maintained or protected 
by the other spouse, or enhanced by the contributions from marital fimds, each spouse may 
share in the appreciation and value during the marriage. If one spouse is entitled to devote his 
or her efforts towards appreciation of his or her separate property because the other spouse 
attended to the affairs of the marriage, each spouse may be entitled to a share of the 
appreciation of the separate property. 
c. Marital property includes all property acquired by either party during the 
marriage. Separate property normally includes property brought into the marriage, including 
interest or appreciation on pre-marital property. Property acquired during the marriage witfr 
proceeds from separate property is usually considered pre-marital and not marital. How 
properties are titled is not determinative of whether it is separate or marital. Normally 
property is to be valued at the time of the trial but may be valued at the time of separation or 
other time if justified. 
Based upon the foregoing principles of law this Court concludes as follows: 
2. These parties as of the date of marriage were somewhat older than is typical and 
hence each brought substantially more property to the marriage as separate property than as 
customary. 
3. The marriage before separation was under five years. 
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4. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties herein and the subject matter of this 
action. 
5. Margee is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from Chuck, which divorce shall 
become final immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
6. Each of the parties should be awarded joint legal custody and care of their 
daughter, Cheyanna, whose primary residence and physical custody shall be with the Petitioner. 
The parties shall be required to observe their agreed upon parenting plan, including parent-time 
rights. 
7. Respondent should pay to Petitioner as and for his share of child support the 
sum of $567.00 per month commencing on March 1, 2005, which sum is consistent with the 
statewide child support guidelines, together with his share of the child's portion of health 
insurance premiums, until the parties minor child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high 
school with her regular class, whichever is later. 
8. The parties shall be required to reimburse each other for uninsured medical and 
dental expenses with respect to Cheyanna, in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
9. Margee is entitled to an order and judgment in her favor in the amount of 
$1,586.28 for the unpaid cost of health insurance made available to him since the parties* 
separation. 
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10. Margee is entitled to an order and judgment in her favor in the amount of $938.50, 
representing Margee's one-half share of the $1,877.00 Chuck received from the consignment sale 
of some of the parties' furniture following the removal of such furniture from the Marital Home. 
11. Neither party should be awarded alimony or support from the other. 
12. Contributions made during the marriage, together with the increases and/or 
decreases associated with said contributions, made to and on behalf of Petitioner to her 
Pension, Delta Care Savings, 401K, and other compensation plan or plans as a result of her 
employment with Delta Airlines, should be divided pursuant to a qualified domestic relations 
order. 
13. The parties clearly intended, as the Court has found that their properties 
remained largely separate, but not entirely. The parties moved into the Park City condo which 
Petitioner had purchased well before the marriage, however, Respondent almost immediately 
paid off the $55,000 mortgage on that condo. Petitioner later quit-claimed joint ownership of 
the property to Respondent. The parties kept separate accounts throughout the marriage with 
no joint accounts at any time. 
14. Each agreed Respondent would maintain his business. While the court finds 
that it was not conduct that would enhance any marriage, the Court concludes that the 
Respondent's conduct in unilaterally selling the Aerie property was not an effort or an attempt 
to commingle his separate property with other property. Aerie was the marital home and even 
though it was funded completely by Respondent's separate marital property (with the exception 
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of $79,000 from Petitioner) it became a marital residence. However because it sold for only 
nominal profit in 2004, the conduct surrounding the sale of Aerie is of lesser importance to the 
Court. 
15. With respect to the Dune property, the Court cannot conclude that the 
Respondent intended to give up that property or that the reason Dune is still his property is 
because of Petitioner. Nor can the Court conclude that the sale of the Aerie property showed 
any intent on behalf of Respondent to commingle his separate properties. 
16. The Court concludes, as the evidence demonstrates, that Respondent signed a 
quit claim deed to himself and Petitioner on the Aerie property, but that was done at the behest 
of Washington Mutual Bank for its internal purposes and did not evidence a clear intent to treat 
the property as marital, nor to commingle the property. Respondent did not evidence a clear 
intent to treat the Aerie property as marital or to commingle his separate property contribution. 
The course of events, coupled with the entire history of Respondents dealings, leads this Court 
to conclude that there was no intent on behalf of Respondent to convey Aerie to Petitioner, nor 
to commingle his separate property. 
17. The Court concludes that the most equitable way to deal with distribution of 
marital property (Aerie house and Park City Condo) is not to give Petitioner credit for simple 
appreciation of values, with respect to Dune Road, but to back out of the marital estate what 
was put in as each party's separate property. 
32 
18. Accordingly, the Court concludes that marital and pre-marital property 
distribution should be as set forth on Respondent's Exhibit 118 (as adjusted by the values 
found by this Court) as follows: 
i. The value of all property subject to distribution by this Court is 
$829,600 which includes $263,000 from the escrow account, $381,000 for the value of 
the Little Kate property, $150,0000 for the value of the Park City condominium, 
$33,600 for the value of automobiles in Respondents possession, and $2,000 for a 4-
wheeler in Respondent's possession. 
iL Before a division of marital property, the Respondent should be awarded 
the sum of $674,500 the sum Respondent contributed from his pre-marital property into the 
parties Aerie home and Park City condo. 
iii.. The Petitioner should be awarded the sum of $79,000 representing 
separate property she contributed from her pre-marital property, together with her $95,000 
equity in the Park City condo, valued at the time of trial. 
iv. After both parties have received back their pre-marital contributions, 
there is no net marital estate for distribution, nor is there enougli to fully reimburse each party 
for their separate contributions. Accordingly, each party shall be charged one-half of the deficit 
amount of $18,900, against the property each shall be awarded. 
19. In order to accomplish the foregoing, the Petitioner, who is entitled to $174,000 
for her pre-marital contributions, less the deficit amount of $9,450, should be awarded the 
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Park City condo valued at $150,000, together with the sum of $14,550 from the escrowed 
funds. ($79,000+$95,000=$174,000 less %$18,900=$164,550). 
20. The Respondent, who is entitled to $674,500 for his pre-marital contributions, 
less the deficit amount of $9, 450, should be awarded the Little Kate property, his three 
automobiles, the 4-wheeler, and the sum of $248,450 from the escrow account, for a total of 
$665,050. ($674,500 less % of $18,900=$665,050). 
21. Petitioner should be awarded judgment against Respondent in the amount of 
$2,524.73 representing.$1,586.23 for Chuck's health insurance premium owed to Petitioner 
and.$938.50 for Margee's share of furniture sold by Chuck. 
22. All other property or accounts should be awarded to the party who possesses the 
same, or in whose name the property exists, with the exception of the rental account on the 
Dune Road property, which rental account should be awarded to Respondent as his separate 
property, free and clear of any claim on the part of Petitioner. 
23. Each party should be mutually restrained from demeaning or disparaging the other to 
the parties' minor child or to any third person, including neighbors, friends and the community, and 
each are to observe the Parenting Plan in good faith, including notification provisions. 
24. Neither party is entitled to attorney's fees and each are to bear their own costs 
and fees herein. 
25. The Court vacates all contempt findings and concludes that no contempt 
sanctions should be imposed upon either party. 
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26. Each party should be ordered to fully cooperate in facilitating the transfer of 
properties contemplated herein. All prior temporary orders, escrow accounts, or Lis Pendens 
filed by Petitioner shall be void and terminated upon execution of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED t h i s ^ y day of April, 2005. 
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Kent B. Linebaugh 
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ADDENDUM C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF 
FEBRUARY 18, 2005 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICi 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH \ % S 
MARJORIE M. HAYES 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ARTHUR C. HAYES, 
Respondent. 
o 
MEMORANDUM DECISION V f g 
Case Ho.0tyC/90&S#t/ 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK?\ 
DATE: February 18, 2005 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
February 15 and 16, 2005. Petitioner was present with Kent B. 
Linebaugh and Respondent was present with Roger D. Sandack. 
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner filed a petition for divorce on November 3, 
2003. The petition alleged a marriage on December 20, 1998, and 
alleged there was one child born of the union, Cheyanna, who was 
born July 19, 1999. The petition sought joint legal custody and 
other relief. On November 10, 2003, a temporary restraining order 
was issued allowing respondent to remain in the marital 
residence, prohibiting the transfer of assets, allowing 
petitioner to use the condominium of the parties, and granting 
other temporary relief. A hearing was held November 12, 2003, and 
various temporary orders were issued and further hearing on 
financial matters was scheduled for December 8, 2003. 
On December 3, 2003, respondent filed a request for an order 
to show cause. 
On December 2, 2003, respondent filed an answer and 
counterclaim seeking primary physical custody of the child. 
On February 8, 2005, a reply to the counterclaim was filed. 
Further temporary orders were issued December 8, 2003, 
including sole physical custody to petitioner. The court ordered 
an assessment as to parental fitness. Each party then sought 
orders of contempt as to the other party as well as other relief 
including judgments. The court set a trial in early November, 
2004. 
Respondent was held in contempt for selling the marital home 
and buying a new lot without input from petitioner. Sanctions 
were reserved for trial. The court reserved for trial a finding 
of contempt for the sale of the home furnishings by respondent. 
Petitioner was not held in contempt. The court issued a ruling on 
July 21, 2004, and later signed an order August 18, 2004. 
Based on a recusal of the Summit County judge the matter was 
assigned to the Salt Lake Department and to the undersigned on 
October 27, 2004, and the November 2004 trial date was vacated. 
On November 19, 2004, respondent acting pro se filed a 
request for an order to show cause. Petitioner responded and 
sought a sale of property. The commissioner denied the request 
December 9, 2004. 
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The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. 
The court will adopt various proposed findings from 
petitioner (PFF)and respondent (RFF)or otherwise modify or 
indicate its own findings. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As to credibility generally, the court will make some 
comments. Respondent was less than forthright and candid, the 
court finds, as to his income. While he expressed a desire to 
support his child, and a genuine love for his child, and he has 
been doing so since the pendency of this action, the court was . 
given less than ideal information from which to impute his 
income. His tax returns are of no assistance in determining his 
income. He claims he does not "work" nor does he take vacations, 
the meaning of which he seemed unable or unwilling to grasp. The 
court finds in this regard, based on the court's observation of 
respondent while he was testifying, and on his answers, that he 
was elusive and in some ways deceptive about this aspect of the 
case, as well as some others. In some areas he was credible. In 
terms of overall credibility, the court saw several indications 
that cause the court to give less credence to some of his 
testimony. For example, while he admitted signing petitioner's 
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name to various loan documents, and despite his ten years as a 
bank officer and his twenty five years in borrowing money for 
real estate transactions, he stated he did not believe he was 
binding petitioner on the line of credit. There was a document 
which respondent admitted furnishing to Washington Mutual Bank 
which had the words "no mortgage" written on it, which respondent 
admitted writing, but he said it was probably just "doodling" and 
was not meant to influence Washington Mutual. The court realizes 
-respondent's view may well be and in fact probably is correct 
that the Washington Mutual loan was not based on income, rental 
or otherwise, but the court cannot credit such testimony of 
respondent about "doodling." When petitioner's family (Dorothy 
Hinckley) participated in a purchase of a share of the Dune 
property, the documents state she is purchasing a one half, or 
50% "interest" to be conveyed by deed. Yet respondent insisted 
Hinckley only "invested" in the property and he thus, upon advice 
from his accountant, did not report that sum received($325,000) 
on any tax returns in any form whatever. Respondent indicates he 
has no income whatever at present, has done no real estate deals 
in several years, yet somehow has various automobiles, pays child 
support, and evidently otherwise lives a life of his choosing. 
He indicates he cannot work, yet the court sees no observable 
reasons for that statement. For those reasons and others that 
arise from observation of demeanor throughout the trial, the 
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court finds respondent's answers to questions about his income 
are not believable and some other areas are less than fully 
believable. 
As to petitioner, the court found her to be credible in most 
regards but finds generally she was willing to state values of 
properties that are not fully justified. 
1. The court finds in accord with PFF 1-22. The court finds 
RFF 4 a-w are to be included in PFF 21. 
2. The court finds respondent's income is problematic. The 
court finds in accord with PFF 23 and 24, except the court 
imputes the sum of $7,000 per month as gross income. Child 
support is to be calculated from those figures. 
Respondent explained he could not work, yet as found he has 
ten years banking experience in New York with a major bank, has 
vast experience in his own real estate dealings, and even though 
he is 60 years old the court finds he could, if he chose, have 
employment that would earn him that amount. Further, his actual 
available income is simply not clear. He has substantial 
financial "worth" despite a claim of almost no income in the past 
25 years. The court believes for child support purposes it is 
fair that the court impute an amount respondent could earn given 
his experience and background. The evidence from both parties 
was sparse and each party seemed content to allow the court to 
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just somehow "divine" an income for respondent. That is what the 
court has done as best it could. 
3. The court finds in accord with PFF 27-34. 
4. The court finds in accord with RFF 7 except the marriage 
was in late December, 1998, making the marriage currently just 
over six years and just under five years at the time of 
separation. The court finds it is a short term marriage. 
5. The court finds in accord with PFF 42-45 and 47-58 but 
with respect to PFF 44 the court finds the value of the Dune 
property at the time of the marriage was $600,000. The court also 
finds with respect to PFF 58 that while respondent is named as 
beneficiary, that will change upon dissolution of the marriage. 
6. Shortly after the marriage respondent paid off the 
indebtedness against the Park City Condo in the amount of 
$55,000. That was not a "gift" but was done as part of the 
marriage and because it made economic sense as the interest rate 
was 9% and that allowed the condo to be rented at a profit. 
7. The court finds in accord with PFF 60. While petitioner 
encouraged respondent not to sell the Dune property because it 
was a desirable location for vacation and a good investment, the 
decision to retain Dune and sell other properties was a business 
decision of respondent and petitioner is not entitled to and 
financial "credit" for the retention of the Dune property. 
Respondent bought that property in 1975. He remodeled and 
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rebuilt it and paid taxes on it and sought to maintain it and 
keep it a valuable property for 23 years before the marriage. As 
a husband and wife the parties talked about selling various 
properties, and it is true petitioner urged respondent not to 
sell the Dune property. The court finds and concludes that 
petitioner is not the reason he did not sell it* When the home 
on the property was largely washed away by the ocean respondent 
rebuilt it because he desired to maintain it with a view that it 
would ultimately be profitable, even though others told him to 
sell it. Respondent did sell the Florida property with net 
proceeds to respondent in the amount of $106,633 rather than the 
Dune property. Respondent did have Dune on the market in 1999 and 
did sell a half interest to the parents of petitioner. Still, 
the court finds and concludes the decision to retain the Dune 
property was respondents business decision, independent of the 
marital advice from petitioner to retain the property. 
With respect to Dune, the court finds petitioner has 
benefitted greatly from the use of that property and will in the 
future benefit greatly. While she did some work to maintain and 
improve it, the court finds she has not augmented it sufficiently 
that she is entitled to share in the appreciation of its value. 
She has used the property for as much as four months out of the 
year. She has taken friends and family to the property for 
pleasure and vacation. Her parents bought a half interest, 
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which, at the currently appraised value, will cause her parents 
to an receive an increase from the $325,000 purchase price to the 
$1 million share for their half interest, the property now having 
a stipulated value of $2.1 million. Ultimately, that increase 
will likely inure to the benefit of petitioner in terms of 
inheritance, though there was no testimony about her siblings or 
the estate plan of her parents. Still, the court believes that 
any benefit petitioner conferred on the property has and will be 
outweighed by any benefit she has and will continue to receive* 
While the court appreciates that petitioner no doubt 
encouraged respondent to retain Dune, respondent did so out 
business reasons and not at the behest of his wife. The property 
has escalated in value tremendously, and the court finds the land 
alone would be worth at least $2 million dollars. With the 
structure on the home, which petitioner has improved and worked 
on, the value is $2.1 million, which value 
the parties agree on. The improvements to the property were done 
jointly since the marriage. Respondent has engaged in major 
remodel and maintenance efforts before the marriage, long before 
the marriage. The key factor in the elevation of the value has 
been the market forces, coupled with the decision of the United 
*Stated government to take action to protect this beach front area 
by installation of material to protect the area from the ocean. 
That action was based in part on a lawsuit in which respondent 
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participated which compelled that action, which raised the use 
ability of the area which has raised the appreciated value. Based 
on that primarily, the value has increased almost 400% since the 
marriage, but the efforts at getting that government help were 
all before the marriage and all by respondent, as well as 
neighbors, but not attributable to petitioner's efforts. The 
court finds in accord with RFF 12. As noted, petitioner has 
benefitted and will benefit in other ways from the appreciation 
of the value of the property. The court does not entirely 
discount her efforts at retaining the property, but the court 
finds respondent would have done so despite her efforts. The 
court also finds that petitioner has exceeded her authority in 
allowing a lease on the Dune property commencing July, 2005, 
which the court finds petitioner did without approval of 
respondent. 
8. With respect to the Aerie property, the marital home, the 
court finds in accord with PFF 62, 63, 64, except the court finds 
petitioner contributed the sum of $79,000 rather than $94,000. 
The court finds in accord with the last sentence of RFF 8, PFF 
65, 67, 68, RFF 9, 10, and 11, except the court finds 
petitioner's contribution as stated above and not as proposed by 
either party. The court also finds with respect to RFF 9 that the 
value of the Little Kate property is $381,000, based on the 
appraised value rather than the amount offered by a friend. The 
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court finds respondent paid from non-marital funds the sum of 
$700,000, for the construction of the Aerie home, which includes 
the land purchase price of $162,000. 
9. The court finds that in August, the parties discussed 
selling the Aerie home and finding a new home. The court finds 
in accord with PFF 77- 87. The court finds, however, that the 
basis for these actions of respondent was not because he needed 
petitioner's income. The Aerie property had substantial value, 
over $700,000, and a line of credit was available without income 
to support it. The court finds and concludes that petitioner's 
name was on the documents because Washington Mutual requested 
such even though title was in the name of respondent solely at 
the time of the loan application. The court finds respondent did 
not do anything improper in a legal sense in affixing 
petitioner's name to the documents, even though it was clearly 
improper and unwise and unthinking in terms of a marriage. The 
use of her name did not commingle the property. The deed from 
respondent to respondent and petitioner was done at the behest of 
Washington Mutual, who indicated it would then have a deed 
reconveying the property from petitioner and respondent to 
respondent. 
10. The court finds in accord with PFF 89, 93-96, and RFF 13 
except the court finds the date of acquisition of Little Kate 
Road property was September 23, 2003. 
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11. With respect to the sale of Aerie the court finds there 
is more confusion than clarity and the court: cannot find what 
import, if any, the offers and counteroffers and the 
communication and lack of communication between the parties 
should be had. The court finds the parties talked about selling 
Aerie in August, 2003, but their communication thereafter was not 
such that the court can find it was the fault of either. The 
court finds in accord with PFF 111 and 115. The court finds and 
concludes that the failures to communicate about the purchase of 
Little Kate and the sale of Aerie were the fault of both parties 
and the previous finding of contempt as to respondent is vacated. 
The Aerie property eventually sold for a price of $760,000. The 
court finds that sales price was reasonable under all the 
circumstances. The court finds in accord with PFF 119. 
12. Similarly, as to furniture the court finds the evidence 
is not persuasive as to either party, except the court finds in 
accord with PFF 121 and concludes half that amount belongs to 
petitioner. Each party has furniture from the marriage and no 
further findings or awards with respect to furniture are made. 
13. The court finds in accord with RFF 15 and 16. 
14. The court finds in accord with PFF 125-129 and RFF 21 
except finds the mortgage paid off was $55,000, and the court 
finds the value of the Park City Condo is $150,000, and the court 
finds in accord with RFF 22. 
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15. The court finds in accord with RFF 23 in its entirety. 
16. The court finds in accord with RFF 24-26. 
17. The court finds in accord with PFF 154-161, 163-167, 
169. 
18. The court finds that all previous findings of contempt 
are vacated. No contempt findings are entered and all requests 
for a finding of contempt are denied. 
19. The parties should be mutually restrained not only from 
disparaging the other in front of their child but from 
disparaging each others to neighbors, friends, and the community. 
The parties agreed to such in open court. 
20. The court finds respondent has paid the taxes on the 
properties, including the Park City Condo, and has paid 
substantial sums toward the family expenses for utilities and 
family activities for the family and the child and has paid many 
expenses of the marriage that also conferred a major benefit on 
petitioner throughout the marriage. 
LAW 
The court sets forth these principals not as a reminder to 
the parties but as guidance for the court. 
Where a marriage is of short duration, the court may 
consider restoring each party to the condition of the party at 
the time of the marriage, where no children are born of the 
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marriage. 
Each party is presumed entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and half of the marital property. Where 
separate property is augmented or maintained or protected by the 
other spouse, or enhanced by the contribution from marital funds, 
each spouse may share in the appreciation in value during the 
marriage. If one spouse was enabled to devote his or her efforts 
toward appreciation of his or her separate property because the 
other spouse attended to the affairs of the marriage, each spouse 
may be entitled to a share of the appreciation of the separate 
property. 
Marital property includes all property acquired by either 
during the marriage. Separate property normally includes 
property brought into the marriage, including interest or 
appreciation on premarital property. Property acquired during 
the marriage with proceeds from separate property is usually 
considered premarital and not marital. How property is title is 
not determinative of whether it is separate or marital. 
Normally property is to be valued at the time of trial but 
may be valued at the time of separation or other time if 
justified. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Introduction. 
This case, despite the arguments of counsel that it is 
clear, is difficult for the court* However, two principal 
undisputed facts guide the court's conclusions. First, these 
parties at marriage were somewhat older than is typical, and 
hence each brought substantially more property to the marriage, 
as separate property, than is customary. Secondly, the marriage, 
before separation, was under five years. Those two factors 
largely guide the court's determinations. 
The parties clearly intended, and the court so finds, that 
their properties remain largely separate, but not entirely. The 
parties moved into the Park City Condo, which petitioner had 
purchased well before the marriage, and lived in it but 
respondent almost immediately paid off the $55,000 mortgage on 
that condo. They kept separate accounts throughout the marriage, 
with no joint accounts at any time* Each agreed respondent would 
maintain his business. 
Where the difficulty arises, for the court, is that 
respondent evidently believed the marriage was in some ways 
secondary to or part of his business. When purchasing a home on 
Aerie, respondent evidently viewed it as nothing more than an 
ongoing extension of his business, wherein he would buy a 
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residence, live in it, fix it up, gain equity through 
appreciation, and sell it at a profit, and move on to the next 
property and do the same thing. Petitioner believed this Aerie 
property would be the home of the parties and their child. When 
the time came that respondent believed it was time to buy another 
property, he did so as if the Aerie property was his business 
solely and seems to have disregarded the feelings of petitioner. 
While the court finds that was not conduct that would enhance any 
marriage, respondent's conduct was not an effort or attempt to 
commingle his separate property with other property. Aerie was 
the marital home, and even though it was funded completely by 
respondent's separate marital property (with the exception of 
$79,000 from petitioner), it became the marital residence. 
However, because it sold for only minimal profit in 2003, the 
conduct surrounding the sale of Aerie is of lesser importance to 
the court. 
The court fully believes and accepts as a principle of law 
as well as equity that the work of each spouse is valuable to a 
marriage. What one does almost always enables the other party to 
do something else productive. Petitioner's work enabled the 
parties to have benefits such as insurance, free travel, and 
income to meet daily expenses. Petitioner's condo from before 
the marriage enabled the parties to rent their home during the 
2002 Olympics for $40,000, from which the parties bought vehicles 
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and used otherwise for the marriage. Both parties, and the 
child, benefitted from petitioner's work. The parties took 
numerous (over one hundred) airline trips, at no cost, to the 
Dune property and elsewhere. Similarly, respondent's chosen 
field, where his schedule is his own, enabled petitioner to work 
while he remained with the child. His work enabled the parties 
to have a place to go in using the free-fly benefit of 
petitioner's work. 
The major point of contention is Dune. Respondent had been 
involved with that property for 23 years before the marriage and 
the court has made several findings with respect to his efforts. 
The court cannot conclude that respondent intended to give up 
that property nor can the court conclude that the reason it is 
still his property is because of petitioner. While certainly 
there is evidence respondent intended to sell the property at 
times in the past, in 1999, respondent had held on to that 
property in times more difficult for him than the times in 1999 
when they parties wanted to build a family home. 
Similarly, the court cannot conclude that the sale of the 
Aerie property showed any intent on behalf of respondent to 
commingle the properties. The court concludes, as set forth 
below, that the evidence shows respondent did sign a deed 
conveying that property to himself and petitioner as joint 
tenants, but the evidence compels the court to conclude that was 
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done at the behest of Washington Mutual, for internal purposes, 
arid did not evidence a clear intent to treat the property as 
marital nor to commingle the property* That line of credit was 
approved, according to Exhibit 10, on February 4, 2003. On 
February 6, 2004, the bank was sent an e-mail and a bank loan 
officer made a hand written note on that message that a deed was 
to be prepared back to the name of respondent alone. That course 
of events, coupled with the entire history of respondent's 
dealings, leads the court to conclude there was no intent on 
behalf of respondent to convey Aerie to petitioner nor to 
commingle the separate property. 
The court concludes that the most equitable way to deal with 
this is as respondent suggests. Indeed this was a marital home, 
and marital property, as was the Park City Condo. The proper way 
to make a distribution that is fair is not to give petitioner 
credit for simple appreciation of values, with respect to Dune, 
but the back out of the marital estate what was put in as 
separate property. 
1. The court concludes in accord with PFF conclusions 1-6 
and 11. 
2. The court concludes in accord with RFF conclusion 3 and 
that the sum of child support should be calculated on the gross 
income figures found by the court above. 
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3. The court concludes in accord with RFF conclusion 4. 
4. The court concludes in accord with RFF conclusions, as 
set forth in Exhibit 118, except that the figures are to be as 
above found concerning values and contributions. The court 
concludes in accord with RFF conclusion 7 c. 
5. Each party should be mutually restrained from disparaging 
each other to the child and to anyone else. 
6* Neither party is entitled to attorney fees and each party 
to bear their own fees. 
7. No contempt sanctions should be imposed as the contempt 
finding is vacated. 
The parties are to work together to prepare findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and a decree of divorce in compliance 
with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
DATED this day of f^0^' , 2005. 
BY T 
BRtfCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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1 J prices. 
2 J Q. Those prices, then, that — they're as to their present 
3 values of those automobiles, are they reflected in your amended 
4 I financial declaration? 
5 I A. Yes. 
6 I Q. Are you — are you of the opinion that those are fair 
7 J and reasonable values for those cars? 
8 A. Yes. 
I * 
9 J Q. With respect to all of the other present values of the 
10 I assets listed in your amended financial declaration Exhibit 2, 
11 I you've indicated what those present values are for all of them. 
12 I You feel that that document current — reflects the current 
13 J present value of all of those assets, except for the Park City 
14 I condo, with respect to which it increase its value 2,000? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 1 Q. Between February of 2002 when you and Chuck and Margie 
17 I moved into the marital home and about September 2003 — well, the 
18 I evidence indicates September 26th, 2003 when Chuck went out and 
19 I purchased Kate Roadr between those two periods of time, about 
20 I two-and-a-half years, what did Chuck do? Was he working in any 
21 way? 
22 A. No. 
23 I Q. Since the time of your marriage has Chuck taken up any 
24 I new hobbies or avocations of any kind? 
25 J A. Yes. He's taken up skiing. I got him into ski racing, 
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THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. BY MR. SANDACK: Are you aware of any other times? 
A. Not that I can recall. 
Q. You recall that on July 20th, 2002 he paid $1352 towards 
your Discover card? 
A. No, I don't recall. 
Q. In October of x02 he paid $508; do you recall that? 
A. No. 
Q. On February of *02 he paid $1589; do you recall that? 
A. Nor I'm sorry. I don't recall any of them. 
Q. You also recall that he paid all of the tax bills — 
the income tax bills to the extent that there were income tax 
bills? 
A. Yes. 
Q. During this entire period of time that he was married to 
you, he made no income, did he? 
A. Yes, he — 
MR. LINEBAUGH: Objection, that calls for a legal 
conclusion by what you mean by income. 
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MR. SANDACK: Let me restate the question. 
Q. BY MR. SANDACK: He made no earned income, did he? 
MR. LINEBAUGH: Same objection, unless she understands 
what earned income is as a legal proposition. 
Q. BY MR. SANDACK: He didn't work, did he? 
A. A job, no. 
Q. Do you know how much income he made from the rental of 
Dune? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much? 
A. In 1998 he made 35,000. In 1999, 35,000. In 2000 — 
2000 was 35,000; and 2001 it was 51,000; and 2002 it was 50 — I 
think 51,000 again. Then 2003 it was in the 50,000 — 54,000 
maybe. 
Q. Now those are gross rental receipts you're referring to, 
aren't they? 
A. Yes, they are the gross. 
Q. That doesn't include your parent's 50 percent 
contribution, does it? 
A. No, and expenses, it does not. 
Q. All right. So do you have any knowledge as to what his 
net take home was? 
A. I do. I do have a paper on that — what my mother — 
the checks that he got. 
Q. In fact, one year he got as little as $6600, didn't he? 
I 
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1 I see Dune Road sold at any time; isn't that correct? 
2 I A. I told Chuck that many a time, and that's how I got my 
3 I mother to buy into the house because I wanted the house for the 
4 I family. I wanted a vacation home, and it was a great investment. 
5 I So I begged my mother to go in on the house, 
6 I Q. Even after this divorce is over, whether or not you are 
7 awarded any portion of Dune Road, you still would like your 
8 I mother not to sell her interest in Dune Road. 
9 I A. My mother does not want to be partners with Chuck. She 
10 I is more than willing to sell the house. 
11 I Q. Why, then, if you know, did they enter into a lease for 
12 I this coming summer of 2005 without Chuck's approval? 
13 I A. Because we thought our court date was going to be in 
14 J June. You couldn't sell the house — if the court date was in 
15 I June and you went and you put the house up for sale, it's not 
16 J going to sell by — in a month. 
17 Q. Now — 
18 A. So mom needed the expenses to pay for taxes. Taxes are 
19 due in May. 
20 I Q. Do you know whether or not your parents have transferred 
21 I any portion of their interest in that property to you? 
22 A. No, they have not. 
23 I Q. Do you expect that they are going to? 
24 A. No. 
25 I MR. SANDACK: Excuse me one moment, your Honor. I think 
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1 J A* Yeah. It was pretty much me that picked it out, but the 
2 I time line is about right. 
3 Q. During that year 1999 and prior to the time the property 
4 ( was sold — half of it was sold to her mother, okay? 
5 I A. Wait, are you talking about Airy Drive or what are you 
6 I talking about? 
7 I Q. No, I'm talking about Dune — I'm sorry, back — I'm 
8 I sorry. I'm talking about the time that you picked out a lot for 
9 J the marital home — 
10 A. For the — 
11 I Q. Between then and the time that you sold half of Dune 
12 Road to Mrs. Hinckley, which is all in 1999, isn't it? 
13 J A. I believe it was. 
14 I Q. Yeah. During that time did you try to sell Dune Road? 
15 I A. Did I try to sell Dune Road? After I sold half of — or 
16 I after she invested — 
17 I Q. No, before. Before you sold half the interest. 
18 I A. Yeah, I believe it put it on the market for 650. 
19 Q. You couldn't get it sold, could you? 
20 J A. Oh, I definitely could have sold it. It was only on the 
21 J market for a short while. I had realtors calling me. 
22 J Q. I see. When did these realtors come to you with a 650 
23 offer? 
24 J A. There was no offer. There was a lot of inquiries. 
25 I Q. So you tried unsuccessfully to sell it. You didn't get 
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1 J it sold. 
) I 
2 A. It was only on the market for a little while. 
3 j Q. How long? How long? 
4 J A. 0hr I'd said six or eight weeks. I — it was six years 
5 I ago. I don't remember. 
6 [ Q. Let me show you some documents to see if it refreshes 
7 I your recollection as to when you put in on the market. 
8 J A. Great. If you have this stuff then go ahead and ask me. 
9 1 Q. Let me show you three pages here to see if that 
10 I refreshes your recollection as to when you put it on the market. 
11 A. April 26th, is that what this says? 
12 Q. What year? 
13 A. In *99, 650,000. 
14 J Q. So it was on for months before you finally got it 
15 J sold — half interest sold to Mrs. Hinckley, right? 
16 j A. It was what? 
17 I Q. It was on the market for months — not just weeks, but 
18 J for months before you got it sold half interest to Mrs. Hinckley. 
19 I A. Before I got it sold. Well, there was a lot of 
20 I negotiations. What do you mean? When was — okay, when was — 
21 J what date did Mrs. Hinckley give me — was it February? No, it 
22 I was December, right? 
23 Q. Mrs. Hinckley and you entered into an agreement — it's 
24 1 in evidence — where you agreed in November of 2000 — 1999. 
25 I A. November. 
-233-
1 J Q. This is an April document. 
2 J A. This is April 26th. So May, June, July, August, 
3 I September, October, November. Seven months, and probably it was 
4 I three months of negotiating with — I mean the Hinckleys didn't 
5 I just walk up to me one day and hand me a check, okay? 
6 I Q. Would you concede that you were trying to sell Dune Road 
7 at least from April on in 1999 for $650,000? 
8 I A. I didn't read that whole thing, but is that a listing 
9 I agreement. I'll agree to it if you just say it is. 
10 I Q. Well, I'm just asking you, would you agree to that 
11 I proposition that you were trying to sell — 
12 I A. I don't recall. If you say that's a listing — 
13 I Q. Does this refresh your recollection at all? 
14 I A. Let me read it again. (Witness reads document). It 
15 says 695,000, by the way. 
16 J Q. Can you look at any of the other documents there that — 
17 I A. In September 17th, *99 it was listed, it looks like, at 
18 j 695 through Gayle Osmond. So maybe I'm wrong about 650. Maybe 
19 I it was 695. The other thing, though, is I didn't sign this, so 
20 there's no telling whether this is an actual agreement or not. 
21 I Q. You don't remember; is that right? 
22 A. That's correct. 
23 Q. Now the earliest of these documents I've been showing 
24 J you is in April and the price is 650, is it not? 
25 J A. I didn't sign it. Someone might have typed that up in 
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1 I their office, I have no idea. 
2 J Q. Ifm just asking if this refreshes your recollection to 
3 J help you understand or tell us under oath that as early as April 
4 of 1999 you were trying to sell Dune Road for $650,000. Does 
5 J that refresh your recollection at all? 
6 J A. Not the date. Amount, yes. 
7 Q. All right. 
8 I A. Except that 695 also comes up in my mind, too. 
9 * Q. That's reflected in — 
10 I A. I mean I remember some conversations — 
11 Q. (Inaudible) . 
12 I A. — but I have no idea what they — 
13 J Q. And it's true that you didn't get Dune Road sold for 
14 I either of those prices, right, in 1999 before Mrs. Hinckley came 
15 I along and bought half. That's true; is it not? 
16 I A. That's true. 
17 J Q. Okay. Now the evidence that's already in indicates that 
18 I you and Mrs. Hinckley did enter into an agreement in November of 
19 I 1999, pursuant to which you sold her a one-half interest in Dune 
20 I Road. 
21 I A. She invested in Dune Road. 
22 I Q. Well, she bought a half interest. 
23 I A. She has always argued about the definition of what her 
24 J investment was. She wouldn't call it a partnership and then she 
25 I wouldn't call it an investment and then she wouldn't call it a 
-235-
1 I sale. I have no idea what she calls it. I gave her 50 percent 
2 I of it. She invested in 50 percent of it, 
3 J Q. All right. She bought half of it; is that fair to say? 
4 J A. No. She invested in it. If I say sale, then I have 
5 I to — my accountant told mer okay? It's not a sale. It's an 
6 I investment. I'm just telling you what my accountant said. 
7 J Q. Isn't it true that without that sale — one-half of Dune 
8 I Road to Mrs. Hinckley, you could not have gone ahead to furnish 
9 I or put up and complete the marital home that you had agreed to 
10 I provide at the beginning of this marriage? 
11 MR. SANDACK: I'll object to the form. That calls for 
12 J speculation. 
13 THE COURT: Sustained. 
14 Q. BY MR. LINEBAUGH: Well, didn't you so testify in your 
15 I deposition that without having sold that you couldn't have gone 
16 I ahead to purchase that property — or to develop the marital 
17 home? 
18 I MR. SANDACK: That would be subject to the same 
19 I objection in his deposition. 
20 J MR. LINEBAUGH: His own lawyer asked the question in the 
21 j deposition, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Rephrase it. 
23 Q. BY MR. LINEBAUGH: At the time that you sold one-half of 
24 J Dune Road to Mrs. Hinckleyr or let her invest in it, or whatever 
25 I way you want to call it; at that time were you convinced that you 
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1 J had to sell Dune — half of Dune Road in order to complete the 
2 I development of the marital home? 
3 A. Was I convinced? 
4 I Q. Yeah, were you convinced of that? 
5 1 A. As is my history, I sell real estate. I buy it and I 
6 I sell it to buy the next one. It would have been a viable vehicle 
7 I in which to build the primary resi — it would have been — I 
8 I would have rather sold the whole thing. It would have been much 
9 J easier. But the investment was — yeah, as I do, I sell real 
10 I estate or take money out, borrow against it to invest in the next 
11 I one, which is what I do. 
12 I Q. It's simply a yes or no question, Mr. Hayes. At the 
13 I time that you sold half interest, were you convinced personally 
14 that you had to sell that in order to get the money to go ahead 
15 I and build the marital home? 
16 I A. I'm not sure I was convinced. It was probably one of my 
17 I options. 
18 Q. Do you remember being — do you remember that being 
19 brought up in your deposition? 
20 I A. No. I'm sorry, I don't. 
21 I Q. Let me ask you if in fact your own lawyer put this 
22 question to you and if you gave this answer: 
23 I Q. What assets did you have available to 
24 I sell when you were intending to build the Airy 
25 I Drive residence? 
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1 J By the wayr Counsel, Irra sorry. I'm on page 289, 
2 I MR. SANDACK: I don't have the deposition with me, so — 
3 Q. BY MR. LINEBAUGH: Again the question: 
4 f Q. What assets did you have available to 
5 I sell when you were intending to build the Airy 
6 I Drive residence? 
7 I A. Some cash from past sales of real estate. 
8 J Q. Anything else? 
9 A. And 917 Dune Road. 
10 j Q. Had you not sold at least half of Dune 
11 J Road, would you have been able to build the Airy 
12 j Road property as you did? 
13 I A. Absolutely not. 
14 Was that question — were those questions put to you 
15 j that day, and did you give those.answers? That's a yes or no. 
16 I A. No, it isn't, it's a I don't recall. It was one of my 
17 I options. It's a probability. I don't know how to answer you yes 
18 or no. I don't — 
19 j Q. Is your testimony different today? 
20 J A. I don't know what my testimony was then. 
21 I Q. I just read it to you. 
22 j A. I didn't recall giving that testimony, but it certainly 
23 I was an option, Counsel. I'm not trying to argue with you. 
24 Q. Is your testimony any different today than it was then? 
25 j A. Read it again, please. 
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1 J MR. SANDACK: What page are you on, Counsel? 
2 MR. LINEBAUGH: Page 289. It's the very last three 
3 I questions of the deposition. 
4 Q. BY MR. LINEBAUGH: Again the question is put to you by 
5 I your own lawyer, Mr. Woodall: 
6 Q. What assets did you have available to 
7 I sell when you were intending to build the Airy 
8 I Drive residence? 
9 I A. Some cash from past sales of real estate. 
10 J Q. Anything else? 
11 I A. And 917 Dune Road. 
12 I Q. Had you not sold at least half of Dune 
13 J Road, would you have been able to build the Airy 
14 I Road property as you did? 
15 I A. Absolutely not. 
16 I My question to you is your testimony any different today 
17 I than it was then? 
18 J A. Very little different. I — there might have been some 
19 j other options, but I certainly agree with that option. 
20 I Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Hayes, that during the course of your 
21 J marriage you concluded that Margie would not let you sell Dune 
22 Road? 
23 J A. No, I never concluded that. 
24 Q. You didn't conclude that? 
25 I A. Margie's and our agreement was that she had nothing to 
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1 J A. Yeah, something along those lines. 
2 I Q. Okay. Should all of that income be necessarily 
3 1 attributable to you in your mind? 
4 I A. I don't — I really don't know, Counsel. 
5 Q. You did — you have not worked since your marriage, as 
6 I your wife also indicated; is that correct? 
7 I A. That's correct. 
8 [ Q. You've made no long term gain or no short term gain? 
9 I « A. That's correct. 
10 I Q. Other than as you've collected in the actual tax return? 
11 I A. Correct. 
12 J Q. You have prepared a document and asked me to help 
13 [ prepare the document which kind of outlines the history of your 
14 J transactions and how much you've made on various properties; have 
15 I you not? 
16 I A. Yes, I have. 
17 I Q. You're prepared to testify about that on direct 
18 I examination? 
19 I A. Yes, sir. 
20 J MR. SANDACK: On your case in chief? Counsel, I'm happy 
21 I to get into that now if you want me to do that. 
22 MR. LINEBAUGH: No, no. I think you should do it that 
23 J way. That's what I anticipated. 
24 Q. BY MR. SANDACK: Okay. It's not as though you're trying 
25 I to hide from your responsibilities or obligations to your child; 
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1 J understand. You did have income out of the transfer of one-half 
2 I of Dune Road that you did not report in the tax returns? 
3 j A. That's right. 
4 I Q. Okay. Now you testified that the value of Dune Road, at 
5 J least if I understand your testimony, is solely attributable to 
6 I the fact of market forces; it has nothing to do with the value of 
7 I the home on it or any of the work that you or Margie did or any 
8 J of the rental income that it generated, but it's all just a 
9 direct result of appreciation; is that your testimony? 
10 J A. You stuck in rental income. 
11 I Q. I just want to understand what you're saying. 
12 J A. It is generally considered it's the land there. 
13 I Everyone will tell you — you can visit the people, you can visit 
14 J the realtors, you can visit everywhere, but they all say it's the 
15 J land. 
16 I Q. Okay. Regardless of which approach you take, we're 
17 I still agreed that Dune Road, for whatever reason, is still worth 
18 $2,100,000 today. We're agreed on that? 
19 I A. The last appraisal I got was that, yes. 
20 I Q. Okay. We're not quarreling about that, are we? 
21 I A. I'm not. 
22 Q. Okay. Now as to you, isn't it true that whatever reason 
23 J that Dune Road has appreciated, that you are entitled to it — 
24 j whatever portion you're entitled to is because Margie helped you 
25 I keep it? 
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1 I A. Absolutely not. 
2 I Q. You deny that she helped you keep it? 
3 I A. Absolutely. She had nothing to do with decisions of 
4 J real estate. I would listen as a husband to her opinion. I mean 
5 I if you say that they invested in it because of Margier s 
6 J suggestion, I'll agree with you on that. 
7 Q. You — 
8 I A. But I could have sold it, too. I made the decision. 
9 I Q. Could you have sold one-half to anybody else? 
10 J A. Possibly. 
11 J Q. But you can't cite anybody you could have sold it to, 
12 right? 
13 I A. I've never marketed — 
14 MR. SANDACK: Well, I'm going to object to that, it's 
15 I asking for speculation, your Honor. 
16 THE WITNESS: I don't have — 
17 I THE COURT: Overruled. The question is do you know — 
18 J can you name anybody else you could have sold it to, if he knows. 
19 If the answer is no, then it's no. 
20 Q. BY MR. LINEBAUGH: I mean Margie finding her mother to 
21 J come and acquire one-half of Dune Road was a God send to you, 
22 wasn't it? 
23 J A. Absolutely not. I could have sold that for more, and 
24 I I'm sorry today that I didn't. 
25 Q. And yet you say — 
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1 J Q. Counsel raised an interesting question by his objection. 
2 I Did you have any specific discussion with Mrs. Hayes about the 
3 J nature of this property being yours? 
4 I A. Specifically — 
5 I Q. Was there any need to question whether or not this was 
6 I your property? 
7 J A. No, it was 100 percent my property, until her parents 
8 j bought in. 
9 J Q. Even after her parents bought it, they still regard it 
10 I as your property; do they not? 
11 I A. Absolutely. 
12 MR. LINEBAUGH: Objection, that calls for what's in the 
13 I minds of her parents. 
14 THE COURT: Sustained. 
15 Q. BY MR. SANDACK: Well, do you receive your — the income 
16 I or whatever income that is left and distributed from the rentals 
17 I from Mrs. Hinckley? 
18 J A. I do now. She's a good bookkeeper, so I allowed her to 
19 I keep the books, and she sends — up until recently, she sent me a 
20 I fairly good accounting of the expenses and rent. 
21 J Q. How is it, if you know, that Marjorie's name got on the 
22 I account that was designed to hold the rentals? 
23 J A. You know, I've only had that pointed out to me. Irve 
24 I never noticed it since this whole thing started. I can only 
25 I surmise that Dorothy and Margie considered their half theirs. I 
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Q. Part of those monies came from the — from the line of 
credit on the home? 
A. As is my normal course of business, right. 
Q. Margie's use of funds, as I understand it, was 314,000 
in gross marital value less the non-liquid value of her Park City 
condo, her Sun Valley condo, leaving her — 
A. Net. 
Q. — with 85,000 cash after the sale of Chicago and Sun 
Valley — or Chicago and the note. She invested 68 of that in 
the condo — in Airy; $12,000 from credit card charges — 
A. So she says, yeah. 
Q. — leaving a contribution towards living costs of 
$5,000? 
A. That would be reasonable. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. (Inaudible response) 
MR. SANDACK: I'll hold off moving admission of that for 
a moment, your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. SANDACK: Moving, if you will, to Exhibit 118; 
ask if you can identify this document. 
A. Yeah. This is another depiction of our — 
Q. Is this your request to the Court to distribute 
property? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now it shows — and your calculation of marital property 
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of the escrow account of 263,000, which we know is 
It's in Zion's bank, yes. 
Your value on the Little Kate Road, which you believe to 
be 381,000. 
A. 
Q
* 
That's the appraised value. 
Your value of the Park Avenue condominium, which is 
joint property at 180? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
thousand 
A. 
worth. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
provide 
Correct. 
That has no mortgage on it now? 
Correct. 
The value of the automobiles, which I believe — 
That's approximate. 
— both parties agree are about 30,000? 
Approximately. 
Apparently there's a four wheeler. Is that worth a 
dollars? 
It's not working right now, so I don't know what it's 
She has it worth 2,000. Do you think it's worth 2? 
No, I don't think so. 
Are you willing to give it to her at any value? 
Yes, sir. 1 
That total is $855,000. You're asking the Court to 
back to you the premarital — the contributions made from 
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1 I is mine and what is Cheyanna's to go to someone I knew for four 
2 I months. I just don't ™ I don't see why — what I've worked all 
3 I my life for should be divided in any other way. I (inaudible) 
4 I substantial. She's got another $750,000 from her mother that I 
5 I made her. 
6 I MR. LINEBAUGH: Objection. 
7 THE WITNESS: They don't — 
8 I MR. LINEBAUGH: Objection. Move to strike that comment. 
9 I There's no evidence of that at all in this case. 
10 THE WITNESS: Of value, excuse me. 
11 THE COURT: Overruled. 
12 J THE WITNESS: I mean she's coming out far better, and 
13 I there's just no reason in the world why I should have to suffer 
14 j more than I have through the financial part of this thing because 
15 I I married her. 
16 J Q. BY MR. SANDACK: You do love your daughter? 
17 I A. More than myself. 
18 I Q. It is your intent to ultimately make her the beneficiary 
19 of --
20 J A. She is. 
21 I Q. — your e s ta te? 
22 I A. That's correct . I don't want that to be compromised in 
2 3 J any way. 
24 j Q. You do intend to provide for her during your lifetime; 
25 [ do you not? 
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1 I Q. Because you didn't have to sell all of it. 
2 J A. I had a lot of options. I could have mortgaged it and 
3 I built 938. I could have sold it outright. An option to be able 
4 I to keep half of it and make — and have somebody make an 
5 I investment, a pretty good idea. I couldn't do it with anybody 
6 I else. I only had one wife — one set of in-laws. 
7 I Q. And it turned out very well for you? 
8 I A. It didn't turn out as good — 
9 I Q. Since you sold one half? 
10 I A. — as it could have. I made them $750,000, Counselor. 
11 J Q. But you've made a lot of money yourself, because you 
12 kept it? 
13 J A. I haven't yet. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 I A. I would love a thank you from them sometime, which they 
16 J haven't given or mentioned. 
17 I Q. When did you find out — well, let's strike that. 
18 j That's — as near as we can tell, as near as we can recollect, 
19 I when did you have the conversation with Mr. Barnard where you got 
20 J real — as you call it blue streak with him? 
21 I A. I wish I knew exactly what date I found out that the 
22 I title had been conveyed on a quit claim deed to Margie, but that 
23 I day. 
24 J Q. Let me just interrupt you right there. You knew that 
25 I back when you gave him the deed? 
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1 j A. No, I didn't. I was absolutely sure there were two — 
2 I that he had cleaned it up. 
3 Q. But you — 
4 I A. I didn't even know it until — 
5 J Q. But you knew you conveyed it to Margie back in September 
6 I of 2003. You gave him a deed for that purpose. You knew they 
7 J were going to take it and record itr right? 
8 A. No. 
9 I * Q. Oh, you didn't think they were (inaudible). 
10 I A. They gave another deed to give it back to me. That's 
11 I the one they were going to record. That was his deal. That's 
12 I the one he came up with. 
13 I Q. Okay. At any rate, you called him and confronted him 
14 I about the fact that Margie was still on the title; is that true? 
15 I A. No, I didn't. I called him to say what in the world is 
16 I she doing on the title? 
17 J Q. So my question is when did you find out that she was 
18 still on title? 
19 I A. That day. That conversation. 
20 I Q. Which was when? 
21 I A. I wish I could, Counselor. I don't know. You probably 
22 I have an idea, but I don't — 
23 I Q. Well, this happened in — 
24 A. It was substantially after he was supposed to have 
25 I executed those two quit claim things. 
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meant, WI am going to co-mingle my premarital assets. I'm going 
to invest every dime I've got and give half of it to you, my new 
wife." They never suggested that. They suggested his obligation 
was to provide a home and a house; and that's what he did. 
What did he do to start out? He walked into her 
apartment or her condominium and he paid off her mortgage, 
$55,000. That is certainly allowing them to provide a home. If 
Counsel is suggesting that he someone breached that, I've heard 
neither party at this point in time say that that was a breach of 
the obligation. No one complained at the time. They were 
building a house, and they were using virtually every dime of his 
money to do it with. 
I'll get to Dune Road in a minute, but what we have 
suggested in our proposed distribution clearly recognizes, as in 
any divorce, that the marital abode is a marital property. We 
are not taking the position that that's his separate property. 
What we're taking the position on is that he and she 
should be entitled to their separate contributions into that 
property. What is unique about this situation is that 
unfortunately there is no asset because there is no appreciation 
in that property. It sold for about, according to what I have, 
somewhere around 12 to $15,000 more than it cost to build. Very 
now — very little question about what the costs are. It was 
somewhere around 701 and $703,000. A lot of money. That 
included the lot. 
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When it sold for 760 and you take off the 40 odd 
thousand dollars that the the commission brought down, it brought 
it down to about, I think, 712 or 715. 
Now sure, that's an asset and appreciation, but once 
they then take off the obligations against it, then it wipes it 
away. Now where does it go? It flows into the escrow, which is 
now the cash that is being held there, and it flows into the 
Little Kate property. Just because Little Kate is in his name 
does mean that it is not subject to distribution by the Court. 
We understand that. It's all part and parj*d of the proceeds from 
the sale of the marital home. 
The question becomes whether or not the Court recognizes 
his premarital contribution and whether or not it recognizes her 
premarital contribution. If anything — if there is any co-
mingling at all, it was her contribution from her funds into the 
home that he had in his name. 
We're not taking that position. We're simply taking 
the position that both parties ought to have their separate 
contributions that went into that property back; that's the 
pos — that's the position we took. 
The Court — the Supreme Court and the District Court 
have clearly indicated that separate property can take many 
different forms. Just because one party modifies that form from 
stock or cash or into the property does not necessarily mean that 
it loses its separate character. 
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1 J The party who asks for that distribution to be lost, the 
2 J party who questions the separateness of that separate property is 
3 I the one who is burdened with the obligation to prove that there 
4 I are in fact exceptional circumstances that would make that 
5 I separateness lost on the marital property. 
6 I Now the fact that they didn't build a lot of equity 
7 I during the marriage is not the fault of my client and it's not 
8 I the fault of Mrs. Hayes. The fact of the matter is that she 
9 I benefitted quite substantially from her lifestyle. She, too, if 
10 I you want to look at this so-called agreement didn't comply with 
11 J the agreement. 
12 J The first thing she did was she started out making 
13 I $48,000 a year, as you recall, in 1999, the year that he married 
14 J her. The first thing she did is drop back right down to about 26 
15 J and then she dropped down to 15 and then she dropped down to 11 
16 J and she dropped down to 11 again. The reason she did that is 
17 J because she was getting extra cash flow off of the $55,000 that 
18 J my client had contributed to the Park City rental. 
19 J Now that allowed her to spend, according to her, up to 
20 J four months vacationing in his property in — on the east coast. 
21 J Now I've never heard of any Court reimbursing a party for 
22 J enhancing somebody's lifestyle. That's essentially what I think 
23 I she was arguing, although — what Counsel was arguing. 
24 I Yes, his life was enhanced by his child. He spent an 
25 J awful lot of his money enhancing his lifestyle and enhancing 
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1 J hers* You saw — and the reason we presented the number of 
2 I checks that he allowed to go out of his individual account — his 
3 I separate account for all of these things that she purportedly was 
4 J going to take care of — the utilities and the (inaudible) and 
5 J the child care and the skiing and the computers and all the 
6 I things that he provided her. All the money he provided for her 
7 I own condominium and everything else, all of this came out of his 
8 J side. 
9 I Her net income on $11,000 of gross income from the 
10 J airlines and whatever money she could bring out of the rental on 
11 J her Park City condo for the two or three years that she allowed 
12 I it to be leased wasn't significant enough to really say that she 
13 J met her end of the bargain, either. 
14 I That's not what we're talking about. We're talking 
15 I about dissolving a marital relationship. We're talking about 
16 j identifying what is the separate property and what is the marital 
17 j property, and then making a determination of what would be the 
18 I equitable distribution of that marital property. 
19 I Now I turn to my Exhibit 118 to do that. I've been able 
20 j to get a little bit on leading questions from my client to do 
21 j that, but I wanted to explain what that's all about and why I 
22 J believe it fair and reasonable. 
23 I There is no question that there — in marital property, 
24 J and this is listed in the marital property; that it includes the 
25 I escrow account at 263. It includes the value of Little Kate at 
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1 j 381. It includes her Park at 180, and yes, there is some 
2 I question about that. The Court can make whatever determinations 
3 J it feels comfortable with. We'll say that she was comfortable 
4 I listing it at 190 when this — when she moved in — when she went 
5 J into the relationship, and it's gone up and down since that time. 
6 J I don't think 180 is a stretch of the imagination, given what's 
7 I gone on up there. 
8 I But in either case he's included his automobiles — and 
9 I by the way, those automobiles were purchased with the cash from 
10 I that Olympic money. But it's still marital property and we're 
11 J still including it in there, and even this four wheeler that may 
12 have $1,000 worth of value. 
13 I The 855. We are asking that the Court reimburse us for 
14 I the separate contributions that were made to the land, to the 
15 I construction and to the Park City condominium. We are backing 
16 J that out. 
17 I We are also backing out any separate contribution she 
18 J made. The cash of $68,000, the Discovery cards that she alleges 
19 I she made into the condominium of $12,000. We have not put down 
20 I the 15,000 because my client has no idea where that money went. 
21 l He didn't get it. Again, that's a matter for the Court to make a 
22 J determination on. It may decide it's there, it may decide there 
23 I isn't enough evidence to do that. 
24 If you adopt this way of thinking and you reimburse the 
25 I parties those amounts, then there is $100,000 left in these 
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5. My husband and I are also the parents of two other adult daughters and 7 other 
grandchildren. 
6« I own an undivided fifty percent (50%) interest in that certain real property located 
at 917 Dune Road, West Hamptcn Beach, New York ("Dune Road"). 
7, Upon the recommendation of our attorney, on or about 1986, my husband and I 
adopted an estate plan that contemplates the future disposition of our estate. 
8, That estate plan does not provide for any assets, including Dune Road or any 
proceeds from :he sale of Dune Road, to be distributed to any of our children, it being a 
generation-skipping plan naming only our grandchildren as beneficiaries. 
9, Accordingly, none of our daughters, including Margee, is a beneficiary of our 
estate plan, and that in the future Margee will not benefit at ail from Dune Road or any of the 
proceeds of Dune Ro*d, not will any previous or fbture increase in the value of Dune Road 
ultimately inure to acr benefit in terms of inheritance from my husband and me. 
OKMlttvf 2 
i ini\-ji—LUV«I inv v»»wc nn -•/ ^niui/v it* i i v i w v 
DATED this 31* day of Maud., 2005. 
SUBSCRIBED AND S * ORN to before me this . 1 / day of MCttcJ) . 2005. 
at- c^ij^f Kesf{Fl 
WVtMHEDMCK 
^NotonrPuMe-Mateof noiktol 
rtfif*MO(*4»0l 
C**imk*m#D0M0«» NOTARYl 
Residing] 
My Commission Expires: 
oitttov: 3 
HAYES vs. HAYES 
Schedule of Properties 
Prepared 4/28/05 
Pre-marital and Post-marital Estates 
Based Upon Court's Memorandum Decisions 
of February 18, 2005 and April 20, 2005 
Page 1 
I Chuck's Property 
Dune Road 
Florida property 
Kate Road Lot 
Dune Road Rental Acct 
Cash accounts 
Zions Escrow 
93 Ford Taurus 
98 Land Rover Discovery 
02 Chevrolet Avalanche 
Four Wheeler 
401 (k) Account 
I Increased Value of Chuck's Estate $' 
TOTAL: 
Date of Marriage 
Dec. 20,1998 
$ 600,000 
106,000 
409,000 
$ 1,115,000 
,762,215 less $1,115,000 = $647,215 
Date of Trial 
Feb. 15,2005 
$ 1,050,000 
381,000 
19,950 
248,450 
1,200 
9,900 
22,500 
2,000 
27,215 
$ . 1,762,215 
Notes: 
Quoguo $349,000, First Security $60,000 
r 
691228J (Excel) 
MAYfcS vs. HAYES 
Schedule of Properties 
Prepared 4/28/05 
Pre-marital and Post-marital Estates 
Based Upon Court's Memorandum Decisions 
of February 18, 2005 and April 20, 2005 
Page 2 
[Margee's Property 
Chicago Condo (Net) 
Park City Condo (Net) 
Sun Valley Condo (Net) 
Delta Credit Union (savings) 
Delta Credit Union (checking) 
Delta 401k 
Delta Stock 
Sequoia Fund 
Sequoia IRA 
Vanguard Brokerage Service Acct. 
Sun Valley Rental Account (Net) 
1994Suburu Legacy 
Zions Escrow 
Increased Value of Margee's Estate ! 
TOTAL: 
Date of Marriage 
Dec. 20,1998 
$ 60,000 
135,000 
90,000 
14,300 
3,700 
126,150 
4,900 
3,500 
14,550 
2,250 
12,000 
$ 466,350 
Id) 
(2) 
5541,065 less $466,350 = $74,715 
Date of Trial 
Feb. 16,2005 
150,000 
177,000 
3,075 
725 
153,365 
3,575 
12,000 
19,200 
5,000 
975 
1,600 
14,550 
$ 541,065 
(?) 
Notes: 
(1) $ 190,000 less 55,000 lien I 
(2) $195,000 less 105,000 lien I 
(3) $275,000 less 98,000 lien | 
Gift from mother during marriage 
691228J (Excel) 
HAYES vs HAYES 
SUMMARY OF ESTATES 
PRE-MARITAL AND POST-MARITAL 
based upon Court's Memorandum Decisions 
of February 18,2005 and April 20,2005 
Page 3 
Value of Total Estates at Time of Marriage: 
$1,115,000 plus $466,350 = $1,581,350 
Percentage of Total Estates initially brought to marriage by Chuck: 
$1,115,000-$1,581,350 = 70.5% 
Percentage of Total Estates initially brought to marriage by Margee: 
$466,360-$1,581,350 = 29.5% 
Value of Total Estates at Time of Trial: 
$1,762,215 plus $541,065 = $2,303,280 
Percentage of Total Estates Awarded to Chuck: 
$1,762,215 -$2,303,280 = 76.5% 
Percentage of Total Estates Awarded to Margee: 
$541,065 - $2,303,280 = 23.5% 
Chuck's Estate Increase in Value: 
$1,115,000 to $1,762,215 = $647,215 or 
58.0% 
Margee's Estate Increase in Value: 
$466,350 to $541,065 = $74,715 or 
16.0% 
691242vl 
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1 I using it. That's what I had in mind. 
2 I Certainly I recognize that there was the possibility she 
3 J would or would not inherit. I have no idea what her parents 
4 I would give her when they pass, but I — that was not the 
5 I determinative factor that she was going to inherit. So even the 
6 I way the findings reads that she'll benefit greatly, again, if 
7 J it's sold tomorrow that greatly word is exaggerated, but form the 
8 I time I wrote what I wrote in February, any use she's had has been 
9 I a benefit. 
10 I So the notion of inheritance isn't — wasn't 
11 I determinativer and that's not specifically and solely what I 
12 I had in mind that she would, if you will, make this up by 
13 I benefitting from her parents in terms of inheritance; simply 
14 I the use of the place. And again, whether she does or she doesn't 
15 I just wasn't and isn't determinative. 
16 I Mr. Linebaugh, I appreciate your arguments here, but I'm 
17 I going to deny both of your motions. It just doesn't seem to me 
18 I that you've con — well, you haven't convinced me I'm wrong. I 
19 I mean if someone else says I'm wrong, I'm wrong, and that's why we 
20 I have those other folks upstairs. But I — I did the best I could 
21 J with it, and I think I'm right. If I thought it ought to have 
22 J been done differently, I would have. 
23 | Don't get me wrong. I'm not saying I never change my 
24 J mind and that once I do it it's done and I'll never think about 
25 I it again, even though I may have hinted that when I wrote what I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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wrote on April 20th. But I've been through and upon getting your 
motions and again recently and what I wrote, and I think that —• 
I think that what I did was correct under the law; and I think 
what I did was equitable. That's why I did it. 
It may be that you can convince someone else, 
Mr. Linebaugh, that I did make a mistake in terms of taking 
separate property out of something that is marital. It may be 
that you can convince someone that she's paying more than her 
share of the deficit and not her pro rata share, but I — it 
isn't — you haven't convinced me. Let's just put it that way. 
I think that — I think I have dealt with those. Again, 
other than the issue you point out about something to do with 
inheritance — and you're absolutely correct. I mean in terms of 
my thinking about that, but it wasn't as determinative as you 
argue I seem to have written that it was. 
So I'm going to deny both of the motions. If you think 
that an appeal is justified and you need a stay, you can, of 
course, get that through a supercedes bond with an appellate 
court. But it — there's no — after this now having denied your 
motions, there's certainly nothing here that's pending now; and 
any other post trial motions I'd be hard pressed to think what 
they would be. 
So you're just going to have to ask someone else, 
Mr. Linebaugh. I simply think that what I did was correct under 
the law and under the facts as I heard them and in equity. 
